Nickel ore is the single most lethal liquefaction cargo in modern bulk shipping. In fourteen months between October 2010 and December 2011, four bulk carriers carrying Indonesian nickel ore capsized and sank, killing 66 seafarers. The cargo is classified Group A under the IMSBC Code because it may liquefy when shipped above its Transportable Moisture Limit. The TML equals 90% of the Flow Moisture Point, and that relationship, a 10% safety margin from the physical flow threshold, is the entire technical basis for the loading prohibition. Yet lateritic nickel ore from Indonesia and the Philippines carries moisture at loading of 25 to 35%, clay minerals that hold water invisibly, and export terminals that are often open stockpiles exposed to monsoon rain. The combination turns the TML framework from a simple compliance check into a daily operational hazard on every voyage.
The cargo is assessed for TML compliance using the nickel ore flow moisture point calculator, with overall Group A classification covered by the IMSBC Group A liquefaction risk calculator and the IMSBC TML moisture check.
The laterite trade: what nickel ore actually is
Lateritic ore geology and why it matters for shipping
Almost all seaborne nickel ore is lateritic, formed by millions of years of tropical weathering of ultramafic rock, chiefly peridotite and dunite, in equatorial regions where rainfall is high and drainage is poor. The weathering process dissolves most other minerals and leaves behind an iron-and-nickel-enriched residual soil. Two commercial ore types result.
Limonite is the upper, goethite-rich zone, typically red-brown, with nickel grades of 0.8 to 1.5% and high iron content of 40 to 50%. It is the standard export product from Indonesia and the Philippines. Saprolite sits below the limonite, where partial serpentinite weathering has produced a yellow-green, siliceous material with nickel grades of 1.5 to 2.5% and lower iron. Saprolite is closer to the original rock structure and has lower clay content than limonite.
The shipping risk concentrates in limonite. Its clay mineral fraction (chiefly goethite, smectite, and halloysite) can hold water content of 30 to 45% at saturation while presenting a surface that looks and feels dry. Clay platelets hold water in the inter-layer spaces of their crystal structure, not just in the macro-voids between particles. This is why the can test, which detects only free pore water at the cargo surface, can register a dry result on limonite that is already above its TML.
Bulk density of exported limonite ore ranges from about 1,500 to 1,900 kg/m³ in situ, with stowage factors at loading typically 0.55 to 0.65 m³/t. This is considerably denser than many mineral concentrates, which matters for stability: the same hold volume carries a heavier cargo mass, so the free-surface effect of a liquefied zone is proportionally larger.
The geography of production
Indonesia is the world’s largest nickel ore producer. The principal producing islands are Sulawesi (with export through ports including Pomalaa, Kendari, and Bungku on the Gulf of Tolo), Halmahera (Buli, Maba, and Weda Bay), Maluku, and the islands of the Banda Sea. The ore belt runs through the eastern arc of the archipelago. Indonesian exports historically went almost entirely to Chinese stainless steel and, more recently, battery-grade nickel processors.
The Philippines is the second-largest exporter. The Caraga region of northeastern Mindanao, centred on Surigao del Norte, is the single largest producing area, with additional production from the Cagayan de Oro hinterland, Palawan, and Tawi-Tawi. Philippine export terminals range from the semi-developed Surigao berths to shallow-draft loading points where ore is barged out to vessels lying at anchor.
New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the southwest Pacific, exports modest volumes of limonite and saprolite ore to Japanese, Korean, and Australian processors, and hosts the Goro and Doniambo smelters that process local ore domestically. New Caledonian ore is also Group A, but the casualty record to date is dominated by Indonesian and Philippine cargoes.
China receives the great majority of all seaborne nickel ore. Chinese stainless steel producers, mainly in Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces, use the ore as feedstock for nickel pig iron (NPI), a lower-cost substitute for refined nickel in austenitic stainless steel production. Battery-grade nickel sulphate production has added a second major demand stream since 2017, as electric vehicle cathode chemistry shifted toward nickel-rich formulations.
Seaborne trade volumes ran at 50 to 60 million tonnes per year in the years before Indonesia’s January 2020 export ban, which prohibited the export of unprocessed nickel ore to force domestic smelter investment. That ban substantially redirected trade toward Philippine exports and increased the relative importance of Philippine loading conditions in the liquefaction risk picture.
IMSBC schedule particulars
The IMSBC Code’s Appendix 1 schedule entry for NICKEL ORE records the following properties, which govern how the cargo must be declared and handled:
| Schedule parameter | Value or requirement |
|---|---|
| Bulk cargo shipping name (BCSN) | NICKEL ORE |
| IMSBC Code group | A |
| Hazard classification | Group A (may liquefy) |
| TML basis | 0.9 × FMP (flow table or penetration test) |
| Bulk density (typical range) | 1,500 to 2,000 kg/m³ |
| Angle of repose | Not applicable (TML/liquefaction risk governs) |
| Moisture content at loading | Typically 25 to 35%; must be below certified TML |
| Cargo declaration requirement | Moisture content certificate (within 7 days of loading start); TML certificate (within 6 months of loading) |
| Specially fitted ships (IMSBC Section 7) | May carry above TML only on vessels built or fitted for the purpose |
The schedule does not list a precise angle of repose because a Group A cargo’s danger is not static sliding but dynamic liquefaction under ship motion. The angle-of-repose concept applies to Group B and Group C cargoes where cargo shift is the primary risk.
The Group A classification and the TML framework
What Group A means in practice
The IMSBC Code classifies all solid bulk cargoes into three groups. Group A cargoes are those that may liquefy if their moisture content exceeds the Transportable Moisture Limit. Nickel ore falls squarely in this group and has done so since the Code’s Appendix 1 first carried a dedicated NICKEL ORE schedule in the 2013 amendments (Resolution MSC.354(92)). Before that schedule existed, nickel ore was declared under generic entries or, in some documented cases, misdeclared altogether, a practice that contributed to the 2010 to 2011 losses.
The Group A classification triggers a mandatory regime before any loading can begin. The shipper must provide two certificates: a TML certificate establishing the cargo type’s physical flow threshold, valid for up to six months before loading; and a moisture content certificate for the actual shipment, dated within seven days before the start of loading. If either document is absent, expired, or shows that the measured moisture content equals or exceeds the TML, loading must not proceed. The master’s obligation to refuse is not discretionary.
The TML and FMP: the physical basis
The cargo liquefaction article covers the soil mechanics of liquefaction in full. For nickel ore, the key relationship is:
The Flow Moisture Point (FMP) is the moisture content at which a prepared sample of the ore first begins to flow under prescribed laboratory agitation: repeated vertical drops of a flow table (the flow table test) or oscillation of a penetration platform (the penetration test). Both test methods appear in IMSBC Code Appendix 2 and produce results in terms of percent moisture (mass of water / total wet mass).
The 10% safety margin built into the TML formula is not arbitrary. It absorbs three documented sources of scatter. First, the FMP test itself has reproducibility limits of roughly ±2 percentage points between laboratories. Second, moisture sampling of a bulk cargo introduces further uncertainty: a representative sample from a large, heterogeneous stockpile is difficult to obtain, and nickel ore’s clay fraction can retain moisture unevenly. Third, moisture pickup can occur during the voyage itself if water penetrates the hold covers. A cargo loaded at exactly 90% of FMP may exceed the FMP before arrival at the discharge port.
The Proctor-Fagerberg test methods (PF for iron ore fines, PF for coal, and the modified version for bauxite) derive TML directly from a compaction-saturation curve without explicitly computing an FMP. These methods do not apply to nickel ore under the current schedule; the flow table and penetration tests are the Code-specified methods for this cargo.
The carriage rule: binary, not graduated
The rule that emerges from the TML framework is binary. If the certified moisture content (MC) of the shipment is strictly less than the certified TML, loading may proceed. If MC equals or exceeds TML, loading must stop. There is no mid-point, no tolerance band, and no provision for the master to use judgment about whether the cargo is “close enough.” A cargo at 99.9% of TML is prohibited, not marginal.
P&I loss-prevention reports from the post-2010 casualty period identified two recurring failure modes. In the first, shippers presented TML certificates that had been obtained under dry-season laboratory conditions but applied to wet-season cargo that had different clay mineralogy and far higher moisture content. In the second, the moisture content certificate was issued before a rain event and was not voided and reissued afterward, producing a document that was nominally valid but factually wrong at the time of loading.
The can test: screening tool, not compliance instrument
The can test is a rapid shipboard check specified in IMSBC Code Section 8. The procedure is straightforward: half-fill a cylindrical metal can of approximately 0.5 to 1 litre capacity with a representative sample from the shipment, then bring it sharply down onto a hard surface from about 0.2 metres height, repeating 25 times at one to two second intervals. If free moisture migrates to the surface, the cargo is suspect and loading must stop until laboratory testing is arranged.
A dry result does not confirm that the cargo is below TML. Nickel ore is the cargo most commonly cited in warnings about the can test’s limitations. The smectite and halloysite clay minerals in limonite ore bind water so tightly that even samples well above TML may produce no visible surface moisture in the can test. The clay matrix simply does not release water under the brief mechanical agitation of the test. P&I surveyors have documented cases where can tests were negative on cargo that laboratory analysis subsequently confirmed was above TML.
The can test is a useful first screen and a required check when the cargo condition is uncertain. It is not a substitute for the certified moisture content certificate, and a negative can result does not discharge the master’s obligation to verify the certificate before loading proceeds. Where a negative can test appears to contradict a suspicious cargo condition (very dark, wet-looking ore, water visible in barge bilges during barge-loading, or loading during rainfall), the master should treat the certificate as suspect and seek independent survey regardless.
The 2010 to 2011 casualty cluster
Scale and significance
The autumn of 2010 produced the worst nickel ore casualty cluster in recorded shipping history. Three bulk carriers sank within six weeks carrying Indonesian nickel ore, and a fourth followed fourteen months later. Combined, these four losses killed 66 seafarers and triggered the most significant revision to the IMSBC nickel ore provisions since the Code entered force.
All four vessels were carrying lateritic nickel ore on the standard Indonesian-to-China trade. All were lost in heavy weather during or shortly after the Indonesian rainy season. None returned a distress signal that reached shore before the vessel capsized. In each case, the progression from first list to capsize was measured in minutes to a few hours.
Jian Fu Star, 27 October 2010
The Jian Fu Star, a Panama-flagged bulk carrier of approximately 35,000 DWT, departed an Indonesian loading port in late October 2010 bound for China with a cargo of nickel ore. On 27 October, in the early hours of the morning, the master was woken by the chief officer after the vessel suddenly listed to port and did not recover. Despite immediate counter-ballasting, the list continued to deepen. The Jian Fu Star capsized and sank. Of 25 crew, 12 were rescued, 1 body was recovered, and 12 remain missing and are presumed dead. The total death toll is 13.
Investigators concluded the most probable cause was cargo liquefaction. The vessel had loaded during the Indonesian rainy season, when stockpile moisture can spike rapidly after precipitation. The timeline from first list to capsize was under 20 minutes.
Nasco Diamond, 10 November 2010
The Nasco Diamond loaded nickel ore from Indonesia and departed for Lianyungang, China in early November 2010. The master had, on earlier contact with his supervision, expressed concern about the wetness of the cargo. He was instructed to proceed. At 11:11 on 9 November, the master called his operator by satellite telephone to report a 3-degree port list with cargo slurry washing around all five holds. That was the last communication. On 10 November, three crew were recovered alive from the sea; the bodies of two others, chief officer Ding Tong Fei and ordinary seaman Chen Xiao Jun, were also found. The remaining 20 crew were never recovered. Death toll: 21.
The Nasco Diamond casualty is the most extensively documented of the 2010 cluster. Three separate official investigations all reached the same conclusion: cargo liquefaction. The cargo declaration problem was also identified: the ore had been declared under a generic entry rather than the Group A nickel ore provisions, and the moisture certificates were later found to be inconsistent with actual cargo conditions.
Hong Wei, 3 December 2010
The Hong Wei sank on 3 December 2010, four weeks after the Nasco Diamond, also while carrying Indonesian nickel ore to China. Ten crew died. The vessel was lost in the South China Sea during adverse weather. Investigations again concluded liquefaction was the most probable cause. The Hong Wei was the third nickel ore bulk carrier lost in a single rainy season.
The International Group of P&I Clubs issued Circular 739 (January 2011) in direct response to these three losses, calling for urgent industry attention to nickel ore loading procedures from Indonesia and the Philippines and listing specific steps that masters and operators should take before accepting a nickel ore cargo.
Vinalines Queen, 25 December 2011
The Vinalines Queen was a 2005-built Vietnamese-flagged supramax bulk carrier, approximately 56,000 DWT. In December 2011 she loaded 54,400 tonnes of nickel ore from Morowali, Sulawesi, Indonesia, bound for Ningde, Fujian Province, China. On 25 December the vessel was reported missing while in heavy weather. She had transmitted a final message reporting an 18-degree list. One crewman was subsequently found alive, rescued by the vessel London Courage from the open ocean. The remaining 22 crew were lost. Death toll: 22.
Investigations determined that the Vinalines Queen capsized due to cargo liquefaction. The Morowali terminal is on the eastern coast of Sulawesi, in a region that receives heavy rainfall year-round, with December falling in the wet season. The 18-degree list reported in the final message is consistent with a large volume of cargo having already transitioned to fluid on the low side, creating a free-surface moment that overwhelmed the vessel’s remaining stability.
The four-loss total and the regulatory response
Across the four vessels, 66 seafarers died in fourteen months. The annual Intercargo Bulk Carrier Casualty Report documents that between 2009 and 2018, 101 of the 188 lives (53.7%) lost on bulk carriers above 10,000 DWT were attributable to cargo liquefaction, with nickel ore from Indonesia the dominant single cargo type. The 2010 to 2011 cluster was the proximate cause that drove IMO to mandate a dedicated NICKEL ORE schedule in the 2013 amendments (Resolution MSC.354(92)).
Later casualties
The casualty record did not end in 2011. The Emerald Star, a bulk carrier, was lost in the Pacific in October 2017 while carrying Indonesian nickel ore, with 10 of 26 crew lost. Intercargo published a specific casualty report on the Emerald Star loss. The MV Nur Allya disappeared in the Banda Sea in August 2019 with 25 crew; liquefaction of the nickel ore cargo was suspected. The Devon Bay grounded in 2019 with nickel ore cargo and required emergency response. Each of these events reinforced the finding that the 2010 to 2011 regulatory response, though necessary, had not fully solved the loading-integrity problem.
The monsoon problem and the regulatory response
Why the rainy season is the danger window
Nickel ore’s moisture content at loading is not a fixed property of the ore type; it is a function of weather conditions at the stockpile. Open-air stockpiles at Indonesian and Philippine export terminals can absorb rainfall rapidly and drain slowly because the clay fraction is almost impermeable. A stockpile surveyed at 28% moisture on Monday may test at 34% moisture after 24 hours of heavy rain on Tuesday, which in a typical limonite ore with a TML in the 32 to 38% range (highly variable by deposit) means the cargo has crossed from compliant to prohibited in a single day.
The rainy seasons in both producer countries largely overlap with the months of highest export demand. Indonesia’s western coast and Sulawesi see peak rainfall from November to March. The Philippines’ Caraga region on Mindanao’s eastern coast sees rainfall distributed through the year, with typhoon exposure adding unpredictable storm-rainfall events from July to October. The dry season window in which loading conditions are reliably safe is narrower than the commercial trading calendar.
Physical inspection of the stockpile is often impractical. Terminal infrastructure at many Indonesian and Philippine export points is minimal: ore is stockpiled directly on the ground, covered (if at all) with tarpaulins, and loaded by grab crane or conveyor directly into barges or ship holds. The physical remoteness of some terminals, combined with the commercial pressure to load quickly while a vessel is on demurrage, creates conditions in which independent surveying is difficult and certificate fraud has a low probability of detection.
The certificate timing problem
The IMSBC Code requires the moisture content certificate to be dated within seven days before the start of loading. In theory, this means the certificate must reflect conditions close to the time of loading. In practice, P&I Club loss-prevention surveys documented multiple cases after the 2010 cluster where:
- The certificate was issued on a dry day and loading extended over several wet days without reissue.
- The certificate was forged or backdated to show a value below TML when the actual tested value was above it.
- The TML certificate itself was obtained from a non-representative dry-season sample rather than from ore of the same moisture characteristics as the wet-season stockpile.
- The cargo was described under a different BCSN (such as “iron ore” or a local trade name) that did not trigger the Group A requirements at all.
The 2013 IMSBC amendments directly targeted the last problem by creating a dedicated NICKEL ORE schedule entry that named the cargo specifically, closed the misdeclaration gap, and required explicit Group A certification for any cargo presented under that name.
Indonesian regulatory response
Indonesia’s regulatory response ran on two tracks: cargo safety and industrial policy. On cargo safety, the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the national certification body (Sucofindo and related appointed testing laboratories) issued requirements after 2011 for certified moisture testing at loading terminals, with test results to accompany every cargo declaration.
On industrial policy, Indonesia moved toward a phased export ban. A 2009 mining law had originally prohibited export of unprocessed minerals, but the enforcement timeline was extended repeatedly under industry pressure. From January 2020, Indonesia enforced a full ban on nickel ore exports to push investment in domestic NPI and nickel matte smelters. This ban, which dramatically reduced Indonesian nickel ore exports, had the incidental effect of removing the largest single source of liquefaction-risk cargoes from international trade.
The ban was declared compliant with WTO rules in a 2022 panel decision and upheld on appeal in 2024, confirming Indonesia’s right to restrict raw mineral exports. The practical consequence for shipping was that Indonesia, which had supplied the majority of liquefaction casualties, exited the seaborne nickel ore market. Philippine exports rose to compensate but did not fully replace Indonesian volumes.
Philippine regulatory response
The Philippines adopted regulations after 2011 requiring mine operators in the Caraga region to obtain moisture certification from accredited laboratories before shipment, and restricting loading during active rainfall. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) issued guidance specifying that nickel ore must not be loaded during heavy rainfall or typhoon conditions.
Philippine seasonal patterns differ from Indonesia’s. Caraga province on Mindanao’s northeast coast is one of the wettest areas in the Philippines year-round. The rainy season is effectively permanent, modulated by typhoon approach tracks. This makes the seasonal-restriction approach less effective than in Indonesia, where clearer wet/dry season boundaries exist in parts of the producing regions. In the Philippines, the cargo-safety burden falls more heavily on the certificate regime and the master’s inspection.
Loading precautions and the master’s role
Pre-loading obligations
Before the first grab touches the cargo, the master must hold a complete documentation set: a TML certificate dated within six months for the specific ore from the specific source terminal; a moisture content certificate dated within seven days of the start of loading, issued by an IMO-recognized testing laboratory; a cargo declaration with the Bulk Cargo Shipping Name NICKEL ORE, the Group A classification, the declared moisture content, and (following Amendment 07-23, mandatory from 1 January 2025) the bulk density of the shipment.
The master should examine the cargo at the stockpile before loading begins. The visual checks are not a substitute for the certificates but can reveal obvious problems: cargo that is visibly wet, muddy water running from the stockpile, water pooling in the barge holds during barge loading, or a discrepancy between the stated moisture content and the cargo’s visual appearance. Cargo that looks wet or smells of mud when it arrives in the hold deserves to be stopped and surveyed independently.
The can test should be performed at the start of loading and periodically during loading, particularly if weather changes or if a new stockpile lot is introduced. A positive can test result (free moisture visible) requires an immediate halt and laboratory retest. A negative result does not permit the master to set aside the certificate check.
Loading monitoring
Once loading begins, the master should monitor the bilge wells in each hold. Rising bilge water during loading, especially water that carries fine sediment, indicates that the cargo is releasing moisture under the compaction stress of loading itself. This is a warning sign that should trigger a loading halt and independent testing.
The master should also track weather during the loading operation. If significant rainfall begins after loading has started, the Code requires loading to stop. Resumption requires either a new moisture content certificate covering the post-rainfall period or a demonstration (through testing) that the rainfall did not push the stockpile above TML. In practice, getting a new certificate during an active loading operation at a remote terminal is difficult; the safer course is to halt loading, allow the stockpile to drain, and retest before resuming.
Stability monitoring during the voyage
Once the vessel departs with a nickel ore cargo, the master has no direct instrument to detect pore-water pressure changes in the cargo. The early warning signs of developing liquefaction are indirect and often subtle: a slight softening of the vessel’s roll period, a slow developing list that cannot be explained by ballast distribution, or rising bilge levels in one or more holds. By the time a perceptible list develops, significant cargo volume may have already transitioned to fluid.
The established response protocol is: check all bilge wells immediately; if possible, pump the low-side ballast tank and fill the high-side; call the vessel operator and the P&I Club correspondent; do not attempt to correct a large list by helm or engine action alone; and be prepared that the situation may deteriorate faster than it improves. The Jian Fu Star’s counter-ballasting action failed to arrest the list within 20 minutes. The Nasco Diamond’s master reported cargo slurry in all five holds simultaneously: by that point, the vessel had effectively lost cargo containment throughout the hold array.
The master’s right and duty to refuse
SOLAS Chapter VI Regulation 2 and IMSBC Code Section 4 are explicit: the master of a ship must not load a Group A cargo unless the required certificates are presented and show the moisture content is below the TML. This is not a right to be negotiated with the shipper or the charterer. It is a mandatory operational requirement, and a master who proceeds with defective documentation cannot invoke the certificate as a defence in any subsequent casualty investigation.
Commercially, this puts masters under pressure. The cargo may be urgently wanted at the discharge port, the vessel may be on a fixed time charter with demurrage running, and local terminal operators may resist the interruption. The regulatory framework and the case law from the 2010 to 2011 casualties both support the master’s refusal. P&I Clubs consistently advise that a demurrage claim for refusing to load a suspect nickel ore cargo is far less costly than a total loss and a hull, cargo, and crew liability claim.
Schedule amendments and the evolution of the Code
Before the NICKEL ORE schedule: the misdeclaration problem
When the IMSBC Code entered mandatory force on 1 January 2011 (under Resolution MSC.268(85)), it did not contain a dedicated NICKEL ORE schedule in its initial published form. Nickel ore was then declared under generic entries including, in documented cases, entries that did not correctly identify the cargo as Group A. The three vessels lost in October to December 2010 all departed after the IMSBC Code had been adopted at IMO level but before its mandatory force date, in a period when the cargo declaration regime was inconsistent across flag states and terminals.
The introduction of a named NICKEL ORE schedule in the 2013 amendments (Resolution MSC.354(92), Amendment 02-13) closed the primary misdeclaration route. From the 2013 amendments onward, any cargo presented under the name NICKEL ORE carried a Group A classification with explicit TML and moisture content certificate requirements.
Amendment 06-21: updating the Group A definition
Resolution MSC.500(105), adopted 28 April 2022 and mandatory from 1 December 2023, updated the IMSBC Code as Amendment 06-21. A key change was the expansion of the Group A definition to explicitly include dynamic separation alongside liquefaction. Dynamic separation, a mechanism most clearly associated with bauxite fines, involves the formation of a water-and-fine-solids slurry layer above a still-solid bulk rather than uniform liquefaction throughout the hold depth. For nickel ore, where the fine clay fraction is inherently more mobile than the coarser mineral particles, dynamic separation is a relevant hazard alongside full liquefaction. Amendment 06-21 brought both mechanisms under the Group A controls.
Amendment 07-23: bulk density declaration
Resolution MSC.539(107), adopted 8 June 2023 and mandatory from 1 January 2025, added a requirement for shippers to declare bulk density on all cargo declarations for Group A cargoes, including nickel ore. This addressed a documented gap: bulk density of nickel ore is highly variable (1,500 to 2,000 kg/m³ depending on moisture content and ore type) and affects both the hold loading capacity and the free-surface stability calculation. Shippers had sometimes declared low densities to allow larger volumes or to obscure unusually wet cargo, since a wet, high-moisture cargo has a lower bulk density than a dry sample of the same ore.
The Amendment 07-23 changes also refined cargo declaration requirements more broadly. The 2023 edition of the IMSBC Code (published incorporating MSC.539(107)) is the current mandatory reference for all Group A cargo carriage from 1 January 2025.
Related calculators and tools
For practitioners working with nickel ore loading decisions, ShipCalculators.com offers several tools covering this cargo directly:
The IMSBC nickel ore schedule calculator provides the schedule parameters for NICKEL ORE including group classification, TML basis, and declaration requirements. The nickel ore flow moisture point calculator supports TML determination from FMP test results. The IMSBC TML moisture check provides a direct compliance comparison between the certified MC and TML for any Group A cargo. The IMSBC Group A liquefaction risk calculator covers the broader Group A classification framework. The IMSBC bulk cargo finder allows lookup of the full schedule parameters across all IMSBC cargo entries.
For related cargo types, the iron ore concentrate IMSBC schedule and mineral concentrates IMSBC schedule cover the Proctor-Fagerberg test methods and concentrate liquefaction hazards, while cargo liquefaction covers the soil mechanics and TML framework in depth. The IMSBC Group A cargoes article covers the full scope of Group A classification and the section 7 special-ship provisions that permit carriage above TML on purpose-built vessels.
See also
- IMSBC Code: overview and structure
- IMSBC Group A cargoes: liquefaction and TML
- Cargo liquefaction: TML, FMP, and Group A controls
- Mineral concentrates: IMSBC Code schedule
- Iron ore concentrate: IMSBC Code schedule
- Iron ore: IMSBC Code schedule and carriage
- Bauxite: IMSBC Code schedule and carriage
- Zinc concentrate: IMSBC Code schedule and carriage
Limitations
This article describes the IMSBC Code nickel ore schedule and the documented casualty record as of the 2023 edition of the IMSBC Code (incorporating Amendment 07-23, Resolution MSC.539(107), mandatory from 1 January 2025). The schedule is subject to ongoing amendment at IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee; practitioners must verify the current edition in force under their flag state before relying on any specific schedule parameter.
TML values cited in this article are illustrative of the ranges documented in P&I and class-society guidance for Indonesian and Philippine limonite ore. Actual TML for any specific cargo is determined by laboratory testing of a representative sample and varies by deposit, season, and processing. No figure in this article substitutes for a certified TML issued by an accredited laboratory for the specific shipment.
The casualty accounts are drawn from official P&I and industry casualty reports available at the time of writing. Formal casualty investigations are conducted by flag states and, in some cases, by coastal states; their conclusions carry the greatest authority. Where investigation reports reached different conclusions or where a cause remained officially undetermined, this article records the most probable cause as assessed by investigators, not as a definitive legal finding.
The Indonesian nickel ore export ban has substantially altered the trade-flow picture since January 2020. Policy on both export restrictions and domestic processing requirements changes frequently; readers following this trade for commercial purposes should verify current Indonesian mining and export regulations directly with the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the Directorate General of Mineral and Coal.