By ShipCalculators.com · Published 8 May 2026 · last updated 7 June 2026

Salvage Convention 1989: Article 13, 14, SCOPIC

The International Convention on Salvage 1989, commonly the Salvage Convention or the 1989 London Convention, is the global treaty that governs the legal relationship between a vessel in distress and the salvor who renders services to save her, her cargo, and the marine environment. Adopted at the IMO Diplomatic Conference in London on 28 April 1989 and entered into force on 14 July 1996, the Convention replaced the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention which, in the wake of the Amoco Cadiz grounding of 1978 and the prospect of a salvor declining environmentally significant work because the value of the threatened ship and cargo was too low to justify intervention, had been overtaken by the modern environmental imperative. The Convention preserves the historic no-cure-no-pay principle in Article 13, under which the salvor receives an award only if the operation produces a useful result, and adds in Article 14 a free-standing special compensation entitlement when the salvor has prevented or minimised damage to the environment, even where Article 13 would yield nothing. The interpretation of Article 14 by the House of Lords in The Nagasaki Spirit (1997) drove the salvage industry and the International Group of P&I Clubs to draft the SCOPIC clause, the “Special Compensation P&I Club” supplemental clause, integrated into Lloyd’s Open Form 2000 and every subsequent edition through the current LOF 2020. SCOPIC is a contractual instrument, not a treaty: it pays a tariff-based daily rate plus a flat 25 percent uplift, separate from the Article 13 award, and the salvor must elect between Article 14 compensation and SCOPIC. The Convention sits alongside the Wreck Removal Convention 2007 which takes over once the casualty becomes a wreck, alongside the OPRC 1990 and HNS Protocol operational response architecture, and alongside the LLMC 1976/1996/2012 limitation regime which expressly excludes salvor claims from limitation under Article 3(a). The pollution-liability instruments CLC 1992, Bunkers 2001 and HNS 2010, and the prevention rules of MARPOL including Annex I and the SOPEP regime, interlock with the salvor’s remunerative regime. Approximately 75 States have ratified, representing more than ninety percent of world merchant tonnage. The dominant agreement form is Lloyd’s Open Form, with the Salvage Arbitration Branch of Lloyd’s administering arbitration on approximately seventy percent of major salvage contracts globally.

Contents

Background: 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention origin

For most of the twentieth century the international law of salvage was the law of the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention, formally the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea, signed at Brussels on 23 September 1910 and ratified by the principal maritime States in the years before the First World War. The Brussels Convention codified pre-existing customary maritime law into eighteen articles. Its central rule was that any voluntary salvage service rendered with useful result entitled the salvor to a remuneration measured by the criteria of skill, danger run, time and labour, value of property saved, and any expense incurred. The remuneration was capped at the value of the property saved. If the salvor failed to save anything of value, the salvor recovered nothing. This was the no-cure-no-pay rule in its purest historical form.

The Brussels Convention served the maritime trade well throughout the steam-ship and early diesel era. The hull was the principal economic asset; the cargo, although valuable, was generally insured on terms that paid out on total loss; the bunker was a small fraction of the casualty value at sea; and the marine environment, although recognised as a public interest, did not feature in private salvage law. The 1967 Torrey Canyon grounding off the Scilly Isles, releasing approximately 119,000 tonnes of Kuwait crude into the English Channel and off the Brittany coast, and the 1978 Amoco Cadiz grounding off Portsall, Brittany, which released 223,000 tonnes of Iranian light crude in the largest coastal pollution event in French history, changed that picture entirely. A modern tanker carrying persistent oil could, on grounding or breaking up, cause environmental damage many orders of magnitude greater than the salvage value of the property at risk. A salvor presented with such a casualty, applying the strict 1910 rule, faced a commercial calculus in which the rational decision was to stand off, observe, and wait for the casualty to break up rather than invest salvage resources for which no property-value recovery existed.

The IMO Legal Committee took the issue onto its programme in the early 1980s under the heading “the salvor’s safety net.” The Comité Maritime International (CMI), the global private-law body that has long advised IMO on salvage, tort, and arrest issues, prepared a draft revision of Brussels 1910 through the early 1980s. The CMI Montréal Draft of 1981 introduced the concept of a safety net for environmental services, separate from the ordinary salvage award. The IMO Legal Committee took up the CMI draft, refined it through five sessions, and convened a Diplomatic Conference at IMO Headquarters in London from 17 to 28 April 1989. The Convention as finally adopted on 28 April 1989 broadly reflected the CMI structure, with the safety net captured in what is now Article 14.

1989 Salvage Convention: adoption and entry into force on 14 July 1996

The Convention as adopted comprises 34 articles and an annex of common understandings reached at the Conference. Articles 1 to 5 set out definitions, scope, and the relationship to other rules. Articles 6 to 11 govern salvage operations themselves, including the duty of the salvor under Article 8 to carry out salvage operations with due care, to prevent or minimise damage to the environment, and to seek assistance from other salvors when reasonably necessary. Articles 12 to 27 govern the remuneration of the salvor, with Article 13 setting out the no-cure-no-pay principle and Article 14 the special compensation. Articles 28 to 34 govern claims, actions, and final clauses. The annex records understandings on issues including the carriage of oil, the relationship to State-owned vessels, and the role of public-authority salvors.

Entry-into-force conditions in Article 29 required deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by 15 States. The clock ran from the deposit of the fifteenth instrument plus one year. The fifteenth instrument was deposited in mid-1995, and the Convention entered into force on 14 July 1996. The IMO Secretary-General acts as depositary; the IMO Legal Committee monitors implementation and amendment proposals; the Maritime Safety Committee tracks the operational interface with SOLAS and the OPRC 1990 architecture.

States bound by the Convention as at 2026 include the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden, among approximately 75 ratifications. Coverage of the world fleet measured by gross tonnage exceeds ninety percent.

Article 13: no-cure-no-pay principle and ten award criteria

Article 13.1 of the 1989 Convention states the rule of remuneration: the salvor’s reward shall be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations, taking into account ten enumerated criteria, and shall not exceed the salved value of the vessel and other property. Article 13.2 establishes that payment is to be made by all of the vessel and other property interests in proportion to their respective salved values. Article 12, the pre-condition to Article 13, states the no-cure-no-pay rule in modern form: salvage operations which have had a useful result give right to a reward, and except as otherwise provided no payment is due if the operations have had no useful result.

The ten Article 13.1 criteria are:

Criterion	Description
1. Salved value	The post-salvage market value of vessel, cargo, freight at risk, and bunker, after deducting deterioration suffered during the operation. Sets the cap on the award.
2. Skill and efforts in preventing/minimising environmental damage	Technical merit of environmental performance during the operation. A 1989 innovation: inserts environmental performance into the Article 13 formula itself.
3. Measure of success	Whether the entire vessel was saved as a going concern, cargo only, partial. Proportional to outcome.
4. Nature and degree of danger	Severity of hazard to the vessel, to the salvor, and to the environment at the time of intervention.
5. Skill and efforts in salving vessel, property, and life	Technical merit of the salvage operation overall. Refloating a grounded VLCC by controlled deballasting earns more than towing a disabled but sound ship in fair weather.
6. Time used and expenses and losses incurred	Salvor’s daily costs of tugs, equipment, and crew, plus time on stand-by, searching, and equipment recovery.
7. Risk of liability	Exposure of the salvor to environmental, cargo-damage, or third-party claims arising from the operation.
8. Promptness of services	Speed of response from initial notification to arrival on scene.
9. Availability and use of salvage equipment	Whether purpose-built salvage tugs and equipment were deployed, or general commercial tugs repurposed.
10. State of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment	Operational condition of the deployed equipment relative to its specification.

The rationale for no-cure-no-pay is operational and economic. Salvage at sea is hazardous, expensive, and uncertain. The salvor commits tugs, equipment, salvage masters, divers, and crew to a casualty without any guarantee of success. The reward, when earned, is intended to compensate the salvor not only for the cost of the successful operation but for the proportion of unsuccessful operations the salvor must attempt to remain commercially viable. The cap at salved value protects property interests against runaway awards; the formula is intended to push awards close to that cap in clear high-risk cases.

The no-cure-no-pay rule does not preclude an alternative contractual basis. Owners and salvors may agree a daily-rate or lump-sum fixed-price salvage contract, sometimes structured as a “wreck-removal style” contract from inception, in which case Article 13 does not apply. The dominant practical form, Lloyd’s Open Form, is a no-cure-no-pay contract that incorporates the Convention by reference and submits the quantum determination to Lloyd’s arbitration.

Article 14: special compensation and the environmental safety net

Article 14.1 introduces the safety net: if the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed to earn a reward under Article 13 at least equivalent to the special compensation assessable under this Article, the salvor shall be entitled to special compensation from the owner of that vessel equivalent to its expenses. The trigger is the threat of damage to the environment, defined in Article 1(d) by reference to substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion, or similar major incidents.

Article 14.2 provides the uplift. If, in the circumstances set out in Article 14.1, the salvor by salvage operations has prevented or minimised damage to the environment, the special compensation payable may be increased up to a maximum of 30 percent of the expenses incurred by the salvor. The tribunal may, if it deems it fair and just to do so and bearing in mind the relevant criteria of Article 13.1, increase the compensation further; in no event shall the total increase be more than 100 percent of the expenses incurred by the salvor.

Article 14.3 defines “salvor’s expenses” as out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred plus a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation, taking into consideration the criteria of skill and effort, promptness, availability and use of intended salvage equipment, and state of readiness and efficiency of equipment.

Article 14.4 provides that the total compensation under Article 14 shall be paid only if and to the extent that it exceeds any reward recoverable under Article 13. Article 14 is therefore a top-up: the salvor first recovers under Article 13 the property-side award, then recovers under Article 14 the environmental-side compensation only to the extent that Article 14 quantum is the larger. Expressed as a formula, the salvor’s total recovery is:

R_{\text{salvor}} = R_{13} + \max\!\left(0,\, S_{14} - R_{13}\right)

where $R_{13}$ is the Article 13 award and $S_{14}$ is the Article 14 special compensation (expenses × uplift factor), with:

S_{14} = E \cdot (1 + r) \quad \text{where } r \in [0,\, 0.30] \text{ standard, up to } r = 1.00 \text{ at tribunal's discretion}

Article 14.5 carries the safety-net rationale: if the salvor has been negligent and has thereby failed to prevent or minimise environmental damage, the salvor may be deprived of the whole or part of the special compensation. Article 14.6 confirms that nothing in the Article affects the owner’s right of recourse against any other person.

Article 13 vs Article 14 vs SCOPIC: comparison

Feature	Article 13	Article 14	SCOPIC
Legal basis	Salvage Convention 1989, treaty	Salvage Convention 1989, treaty	Contractual clause in LOF (not a treaty)
Trigger	Useful result (vessel/cargo/property saved)	Threat to environment, regardless of property result	Salvor invokes by written notice under LOF
Calculation base	Ten award criteria, capped at salved value	Salvor’s expenses at fair rate	Published ISU tariff (daily rates per equipment/crew type)
Uplift	No fixed uplift; scaled by criteria holistically	30% standard; up to 100% at tribunal’s discretion	Flat 25% on tariff total (not discretionary)
Profit element	Yes, baked into the Article 13 reward	No (Nagasaki Spirit: “fair rate” = cost, not profit); profit notionally in uplift only	Yes; 25% is the commercial margin
Cumulative with others	Baseline: offsets Article 14/SCOPIC top-ups	Top-up over Article 13; alternative to SCOPIC	Alternative to Article 14; salvor must elect one
Who pays	All property interests (vessel + cargo) in proportion	Owner of the vessel only	Owner, via P&I Club security
General Average	Award can be declared G/A expenditure	Not declared G/A	Expressly excluded from G/A under YAR 2016 Rule VI
LLMC limitation	Excluded from limitation (LLMC Art 3(a))	Excluded from limitation	Excluded from limitation (contractually structured as salvage)

Article 14 expenses, the Nagasaki Spirit interpretation, and the SCOPIC origin

The mechanics of the Article 14 calculation were central to the modern salvor calculus and generated the decade’s defining litigation. The salvor first establishes its expenses, comprising fuel, lubricants, consumables, port and pilotage charges, equipment loss or damage, and any subcontract costs, plus a fair rate for the salvage tugs and equipment actually used. The fair rate element was litigated extensively before the dispute was resolved by the House of Lords.

Semco Salvage and Marine Pte Ltd v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd, the Nagasaki Spirit case, arose from the collision between the Liberian-flagged VLCC Nagasaki Spirit and the container ship Ocean Blessing in the Strait of Malacca on 19 September 1992. The Nagasaki Spirit, laden with approximately 40,000 tonnes of crude oil cargo, caught fire after the collision; the Ocean Blessing was a total loss with all hands. Semco Salvage, a Singapore-based ISU member, signed Lloyd’s Open Form with the owners and conducted firefighting and tug-tow operations to bring the Nagasaki Spirit to a place of safety, with substantial pollution prevented in a busy strait.

The Article 13 award was modest because the salved value, after the casualty, was correspondingly modest. Semco claimed Article 14 special compensation. The dispute reached the House of Lords in 1997 on the meaning of “fair rate” in Article 14.3. Semco argued that “fair rate” included a profit element so that Article 14 functioned as a positive reward for environmental services. The owners argued it was a cost rate. The House of Lords held for the owners: “fair rate” means a fair rate of expenditure, not of reward. The entrepreneurial profit element under Article 14 is provided by the 30 to 100 percent uplift on the expense base, not by a profit margin inside the expense calculation itself.

The decision was doctrinally defensible but commercially destabilising. Salvors and the International Salvage Union (ISU) calculated that Article 14, post-Nagasaki Spirit, did not produce a recovery sufficient to incentivise a commercial salvor to undertake high-risk, low-property-value environmental cases. Through 1998 and 1999 the ISU and the International Group of P&I Clubs negotiated a contractual supplement that would replace Article 14 by salvor election. The product was the Special Compensation P&I Club clause, SCOPIC, finalised in 1999.

SCOPIC clause: structure, tariff, and mechanics

The SCOPIC clause is a separate supplemental agreement to Lloyd’s Open Form. It is a purely contractual instrument: it is not an IMO convention, not a protocol to the 1989 Salvage Convention, and has no binding effect independent of the LOF agreement in which it is incorporated. It was first integrated into Lloyd’s Open Form 2000 and has appeared in every subsequent LOF edition through LOF 2020.

The SCOPIC mechanism operates by salvor election. The salvor invokes SCOPIC by written notice to the owners, after which the owners have a contractual obligation to provide security for SCOPIC remuneration, normally USD 3 million within two working days. Once invoked, the SCOPIC regime governs all environmental salvage services for the remainder of the operation.

The SCOPIC remuneration is calculated on a tariff basis, not an expenses basis. The ISU publishes the SCOPIC tariff annually, with rates for each class of tug, salvage equipment, salvage master, diver, naval architect, and supervisory crew. The tariff is intended to reflect commercially defensible day rates for the equipment and personnel involved. The salvor’s SCOPIC remuneration is the sum of the daily tariff figures for the personnel and equipment actually used, plus a flat 25 percent uplift on the tariff total:

S_{\text{SCOPIC}} = T + 0.25 \cdot T = 1.25 \cdot T \quad \text{where } T = \sum_{d=1}^{D} \text{tariff}_{d}

with $T$ being the sum of daily tariff rates for equipment and personnel on each of the $D$ SCOPIC-active days. The 25 percent uplift is a fixed contractual figure, not a tribunal-discretion figure: it provides the entrepreneurial profit margin that the Nagasaki Spirit interpretation excluded from Article 14.

SCOPIC runs in parallel with Article 13. The salvor still claims Article 13 for the property-saving result. SCOPIC operates as the substitute for Article 14: if the salvor invokes SCOPIC, the salvor cannot also claim Article 14, and conversely the Article 14 right is preserved if SCOPIC is not invoked. The election is operationally one-way: once SCOPIC is invoked, the regime continues until termination or completion.

The discount provision

A second mechanism in SCOPIC is the discount for non-environmental services. If the Article 13 award exceeds the SCOPIC remuneration, the salvor recovers Article 13 in full and the SCOPIC remuneration is reduced by 25 percent of the difference. This reflects the fact that the salvor benefited from the security guarantee but did not in the end need the SCOPIC safety net. The discount provision deters casual or speculative SCOPIC invocations.

The Special Casualty Representative

A third mechanism is the Special Casualty Representative (SCR). Once SCOPIC is invoked, the owner’s P&I Club may appoint an SCR to attend the casualty, monitor the salvor’s operations, and report independently to the Club. The salvor must permit reasonable access. The SCR is a recognised role in modern salvage practice and is performed by a small specialist consultancy market. The SCR does not direct operations; operational command remains with the salvor and the salvage master.

SCOPIC vs Article 14: salvor’s election in practice

The salvor’s election between Article 14 and SCOPIC is one of the central practical decisions in any LOF case with an environmental dimension. The decision turns on the salvor’s estimate of likely expenses, likely tariff recovery, and likely Article 13 quantum.

Where the salvor expects high tariff time but moderate environmental impact, SCOPIC produces a defensible margin and is generally preferred. The tariff provides certainty: the salvor knows from day one the daily rate it will earn on each tug and each crew member. Where the salvor expects very large environmental damage prevention, the discretionary 100 percent Article 14 uplift can in principle exceed the flat 25 percent SCOPIC uplift on tariff, and Article 14 may theoretically be preferred. In practice, since 2000, the very large majority of LOF environmental cases have proceeded under SCOPIC rather than Article 14.

Consider a numerical illustration: a salvor expends USD 5 million on equipment, fuel, and crew over 30 days on a tanker casualty in environmentally sensitive waters. The Article 13 award is fixed at USD 4 million on a salved value of USD 8 million.

Under Article 14 with the 30 percent standard uplift: $S_{14} = 5{,}000{,}000 \times 1.30 = 6{,}500{,}000$ . Article 13 award is USD 4 million. Top-up under Article 14.4: USD 2.5 million. Total recovery: USD 6.5 million.

Under SCOPIC, if 30 days at average tariff USD 200,000 per day: $T = 30 \times 200{,}000 = 6{,}000{,}000$ , so $S_{\text{SCOPIC}} = 1.25 \times 6{,}000{,}000 = 7{,}500{,}000$ . Top-up over Article 13: USD 3.5 million. Total recovery: USD 7.5 million.

The salvor would elect SCOPIC on these numbers. The election is exercised by written notice. Failure by the owner to provide security within the contractual period entitles the salvor to terminate SCOPIC and revert to Article 14. Failure by the salvor to perform with reasonable care entitles the owner to discount under the standard SCOPIC tariff penalties.

Lloyd’s Open Form 2020 (current edition) and historical evolution

Lloyd’s Open Form, abbreviated LOF, is the dominant salvage agreement form globally. The form has evolved through more than a dozen editions since the original LOF 1908. Modern editions include LOF 1980, LOF 1990, LOF 1995, LOF 2000, LOF 2011, and the current LOF 2020. Each edition has been issued by the Council of Lloyd’s in consultation with the Lloyd’s Salvage Group, the ISU, the International Group of P&I Clubs, and major shipowner associations.

LOF is a two-page agreement that incorporates by reference the LOF Standard Salvage Agreement terms. The salvor and the master sign on board; the agreement is then transmitted to Lloyd’s. The key contractual features are no-cure-no-pay subject to the 1989 Salvage Convention, incorporation of the SCOPIC clause as an opt-in supplement, English law as governing law, and Lloyd’s arbitration as the exclusive dispute mechanism.

LOF 2020, introduced in early 2020, made several refinements: the form was restructured to be more readable for non-English-speaking masters; references to the Salvage Convention and SCOPIC were tightened; the security architecture was clarified; and the option for fixed-rate or hybrid contracting was made more visible. The substantive economic regime, no-cure-no-pay plus optional SCOPIC supplement, was preserved intact.

LOF is used in approximately seventy percent of major salvage contracts globally measured by salved value, and in a smaller proportion measured by case count because many minor casualties are handled under bespoke or daily-rate contracts. ISU statistics consistently show LOF as the dominant form for casualties involving tankers, container ships, or bulk carriers above 40,000 dwt.

Salvage Arbitration Branch and appointed arbitrators

The Salvage Arbitration Branch of Lloyd’s of London administers all LOF arbitrations. It is a department within Lloyd’s, distinct from the insurance market activities, and traces its lineage to the late nineteenth century when Lloyd’s first began administering salvage agreements. The Branch maintains a panel of appointed arbitrators, currently a small number of senior English maritime King’s Counsel, supplemented by an Appeal Arbitrator panel for second-tier appeals.

The arbitration procedure is well established. After completion of the salvage operation, the salvor and the owners exchange statements of case and supporting evidence. The arbitrator holds an oral hearing in London, considers expert evidence on salved values, on environmental impact, and on technical merit, and issues a published Award. The Award is binding subject to appeal under the LOF Appeal Procedure to the Appeal Arbitrator. Appeal Awards are a principal source of doctrinal development in modern salvage law, alongside the High Court (Admiralty) decisions on the same Convention.

The Branch publishes a Salvage Arbitration Awards series available to subscribers and a redacted public summary. Major Awards including The Voutakos (2008), The Rene (2002), The Marine Atlantica (2004), and The Stardust (1996) are routinely cited by arbitrators in subsequent cases.

Relationship to WRC 2007: boundary and transition

The boundary between the salvage regime and the wreck-removal regime is doctrinally important and operationally fluid. The Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention 2007 governs the removal of a wreck once the casualty is no longer susceptible to effective salvage. WRC Article 1.4 defines a wreck to include a ship that is about to sink or strand where effective measures to assist the ship are not already being taken. Salvage Convention Article 8 imposes duties of care on the salvor while salvage is in progress.

In practice, a casualty often begins under LOF and the 1989 Convention as a salvage operation, transitions during the operation as the salvor’s prospects diminish, and ultimately becomes a wreck-removal case under WRC 2007. The contractual transition is normally documented by termination of LOF and a fresh wreck-removal contract, often with the same salvor, on a fixed-price or daily-rate basis. The financial regime shifts: the salvor under WRC works on contract for the registered owner, with the registered owner’s WRC liability backed by the WRC Blue Card compulsory insurance.

Recent cases including the MV Wakashio off Mauritius in 2020 and the X-Press Pearl off Sri Lanka in 2021 illustrate the transition mechanism in modern practice.

Relationship to OPRC 1990: concurrent operational architecture

The OPRC 1990, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, governs the operational architecture for State response to oil pollution. The OPRC regime operates above and around the salvage regime. While the salvor is engaged under LOF, the coastal State retains powers under OPRC to direct or supervise operations, to deploy national or regional response capability, and to declare areas closed to navigation.

In a major casualty the OPRC architecture and the LOF/SCOPIC architecture run in parallel. The salvor delivers private salvage services under LOF; the State provides public response under OPRC; the SCR monitors the salvor on behalf of the P&I Club; and the IMO and ITOPF coordinate technical assistance. The 2000 HNS Protocol to OPRC extends the operational architecture to chemical and hazardous and noxious cargoes, paralleling the HNS Convention 2010 liability regime.

Relationship to LLMC 1976/1996/2012: the salvor exclusion

The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, LLMC 1976, as amended by the 1996 Protocol and the 2012 amendments, provides the global tonnage-based limitation of liability that shipowners and operators invoke in defence of casualty claims. LLMC Article 2 enumerates claims subject to limitation; LLMC Article 4 excludes claims arising from the personal act or omission of the person liable committed with intent to cause loss or recklessly with knowledge that loss would probably result.

A critical interaction with salvage law is the salvor exclusion. LLMC 1976 Article 3(a) and the equivalent provision in the 1996 Protocol expressly exclude claims for salvage and contribution in general average from the claims subject to limitation. The salvor’s claim under Article 13 of the Salvage Convention is therefore not subject to LLMC limitation; the owner cannot invoke a tonnage-based cap to reduce a salvage award.

The position of the salvor’s SCOPIC claim is more layered and was a deliberate drafting decision. SCOPIC is structured contractually so that the SCOPIC remuneration is treated as part of the salvage claim and benefits from the LLMC exclusion. The 2012 LLMC amendments did not alter this architecture. The result is that the salvor recovers under Article 13 and SCOPIC outside the LLMC limitation, while the wreck-removal claim under WRC, where the State authority directs the owner to remove a wreck and recovers cost, falls within LLMC limitation under whichever protocol binds the forum State.

ISU member salvors: global capacity as at 2026

The International Salvage Union (ISU) is the trade association of professional marine salvors. Its membership comprises approximately 60 companies operating salvage tugs, equipment, and salvage masters. The ISU publishes the SCOPIC tariff annually, maintains the SCOPIC committee with the International Group of P&I Clubs, and issues annual statistics on world salvage activity.

Major ISU members through 2020 to 2026 include:

Boskalis Smit Salvage (Netherlands): formed by the 2010 Boskalis acquisition of Smit Internationale, the historical leader in tanker salvage and the salvor of the Tricolor in 2002, the Costa Concordia removal contract through a Titan Salvage joint venture, and many major casualties of the 2000s.
SMIT Singapore and SMIT Shanghai: the regional Asian operations of the Boskalis Smit group.
Resolve Marine Group (United States, Florida): a global tug network with recent involvement in the X-Press Pearl casualty in Sri Lanka and the Modern Express in the Bay of Biscay.
Donjon Marine Group (United States, New Jersey and Norfolk): historically focused on US-flag and East Coast casualties.
Crowley Maritime (United States, Jacksonville): a tug fleet on the US Gulf and East Coast with recent involvement in container-vessel groundings off the US coast.
Ardent Salvage: the joint venture between Crowley and Boskalis that operated 2015 to 2018 before dissolution and reabsorption into the parent companies.
Titan Salvage: the wreck-removal arm of the Crowley group, joint venture partner with Smit on the Costa Concordia parbuckling and removal operation, and lead contractor on numerous wreck-removal cases.
Tsavliris Salvage Group (Cyprus/Piraeus): historically the largest Greek-managed salvor, with a long record in Mediterranean and Black Sea casualties.
Five Oceans Salvage (Greece): a smaller specialist Mediterranean salvor.

ISU members account for the great majority of ISU-tracked global salvage revenue. The ISU has published that salvage revenue declined from approximately USD 750 million in 2014 to approximately USD 300 to 400 million in the early 2020s, reflecting both lower casualty frequency and the tendency for casualties to transition rapidly from salvage to wreck removal.

The salvor market consolidation 2018 to 2024

The salvor market consolidation through the late 2010s and early 2020s was driven by declining casualty count, rising operational cost, and the difficulty of maintaining a global tug fleet on a no-cure-no-pay revenue base. The dissolution of the Crowley-Boskalis Ardent Salvage joint venture in 2018 was emblematic. The two parent companies absorbed the salvage tugs and personnel back into Crowley Salvage and Smit Salvage respectively, ending five years of joint operation intended to consolidate global capacity.

A second consolidation strand was the gradual integration of salvage capability into broader marine-services groups. Boskalis absorbed Smit Salvage as a service line of its dredging and offshore-services business; Crowley integrated Titan Salvage and the residual Ardent fleet into its tug and offshore-services platform; Resolve Marine maintained an independent salvage focus but increasingly secured wreck-removal work as much as salvage work. The market structure as at 2026 is approximately five large global salvors, ten mid-size regional salvors, and a long tail of port-tug operators with occasional salvage capability.

The salvage master role remained central. A salvage master is the senior salvor on board the casualty, responsible for technical decisions including stability assessment, weight transfer, ballast operations, fire-fighting tactics, and the moment of decision to terminate salvage and transition to wreck removal. Salvage masters are typically former master mariners with extensive tug-handling and naval-architecture training, drawn from a small global pool. Both the Article 13 award and the SCOPIC tariff include a specific day rate for the salvage master’s time.

The Voutakos 2008: leading SCOPIC arbitration decision

The Voutakos is the leading Salvage Arbitration Branch decision on SCOPIC mechanics in the period after the 2000 introduction of the clause. The casualty was the bulk carrier Voutakos, which suffered main-engine failure off the Mauritanian coast in February 2007. Tsavliris Salvage signed LOF with the owners and conducted a tow of approximately 600 nautical miles to a Las Palmas anchorage. SCOPIC was invoked.

The Salvage Arbitration Branch decision in 2008 addressed several SCOPIC issues disputed since 2000: the proper construction of the SCOPIC tariff for stand-by time as distinct from active towing time; the application of the 25 percent uplift to subcontract tugs hired by the salvor; the discount provision for non-environmental services; and the treatment of fuel costs as separate tariff items. The Award resolved each issue in favour of a structured tariff approach, increasing predictability for both salvors and Clubs. The Voutakos Award is now routinely cited in SCOPIC settlements and arbitrations.

MV Wakashio 2020: salvage-to-WRC transition case study

The MV Wakashio casualty off Mauritius in July to August 2020 is the major case study in the modern interaction between salvage and wreck removal. The Japanese-owned, Panama-flagged Capesize bulk carrier grounded on the Pointe d’Esny reef off the south-east coast of Mauritius on 25 July 2020, releasing approximately 1,000 tonnes of bunker fuel before the wreck broke in two on 15 August 2020. The Mauritian authorities, supported by international response under the OPRC 1990 architecture, engaged a salvor consortium including Smit Salvage and Nippon Salvage on a salvage contract approximating LOF terms.

The salvage phase, focused on bunker removal and stabilisation, ended with the structural failure on 15 August 2020. The casualty then transitioned to wreck removal under WRC 2007, with the registered owner’s WRC Blue Card insurer providing the liability backing. The bow section was scuttled at sea on 24 August 2020 under Mauritian authority direction; the stern section was towed to a deep-water disposal area in subsequent weeks. The Wakashio file illustrated the modern doctrine that salvage, OPRC response, WRC wreck removal, and pollution liability under Bunkers 2001 operate as concurrent regimes around a single casualty, with contractual and regulatory transitions rather than a single linear regime.

Costa Concordia 2012: LOF and SCOPIC in a long-duration casualty

The Costa Concordia casualty off Giglio Island on 13 January 2012 is the largest salvage and wreck-removal operation of the modern era. The Italian cruise vessel grounded and capsized after striking a submerged rock, with 32 fatalities. The owners signed Lloyd’s Open Form with a joint venture of Smit Salvage and Titan Salvage on 21 January 2012, with SCOPIC invoked from inception given the environmental sensitivity of the Tuscan archipelago.

The salvage operation extended from January 2012 through the parbuckling rotation of the wreck to upright on 16 to 17 September 2013 and the eventual towage to Genoa for scrapping, completed in July 2014. The total cost reported in industry press was approximately USD 1.5 billion, of which a substantial proportion was salvage and wreck-removal cost. The case became a leading reference for SCOPIC practice in long-duration environmental casualties, for the SCR role on a multi-year operation, and for the contractual transition from salvage proper to wreck removal as the casualty became structurally a wreck.

The Costa Concordia file also illustrates the interface between the 1989 Salvage Convention regime and the LLMC 1976/1996/2012 limitation of liability, with Italian forum decisions on tonnage limitation drawing on the salvor exclusion and the wreck-removal claim treatment.

X-Press Pearl 2021: LOF and contractual transition in a chemical-fire casualty

The X-Press Pearl casualty off Colombo, Sri Lanka in May to June 2021 is a recent reference for the LOF-to-WRC transition in container-vessel casualties. The Singapore-flagged feeder container ship suffered a fire after a chemical leak from a damaged container on 20 May 2021. Resolve Marine signed Lloyd’s Open Form with the owners on 25 May 2021. The fire was suppressed by 1 June 2021 but the vessel was structurally compromised; an attempted tow to deeper water resulted in further sinking and the wreck settled on the seabed at approximately 21 metres.

The salvage contract transitioned to a wreck-removal contract during June 2021. The wreck-removal phase, including container retrieval and bunker removal, extended through 2022 and into 2023. The casualty is a reference for the contractual transition mechanics under modern LOF practice, for SCOPIC operation in a chemical-fire context, and for the Sri Lankan State engagement with the WRC 2007 regime.

Tricolor 2002: salvage attempt and wreck removal in the Dover Strait

The Tricolor casualty in the Dover Strait on 14 December 2002 is a foundational reference for the salvage-to-wreck-removal architecture. The Norwegian-flagged car carrier sank in the traffic separation scheme after a collision with the container ship Kariba. Smit Salvage signed LOF for the salvage attempt; structural and environmental conditions made full wreck recovery impossible; the contract transitioned to a wreck-removal operation that completed in 2004 in nine pieces.

The Tricolor predated WRC 2007 by five years; the wreck removal proceeded under bilateral coastal-State arrangements between Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom rather than under any unified treaty. The casualty is the political driver for WRC, the operational template for the modern transition mechanism, and a reference for the joint-coastal-State coordination that WRC 2007 was intended to simplify.

Salvor’s maritime lien under Article 21

Article 21 of the 1989 Salvage Convention preserves the salvor’s maritime lien over the salved property as security for the salvor’s claim. The salvor is entitled to retain possession of the salved vessel and other property until satisfactory security has been provided for the salvor’s claim, including interest and costs. The lien is recognised in domestic law in all major maritime forums, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Greece, and the Netherlands, and is the practical security mechanism that supports the no-cure-no-pay regime.

In practice the salvor releases the property to the owners against a Lloyd’s Open Form Salvage Security letter, normally posted by the owner’s P&I Club, in the amount of the estimated salvage award plus a margin. SCOPIC adds a separate security obligation for SCOPIC remuneration, normally USD 3 million within two working days. The combined security architecture allows the salvor to release the casualty quickly while preserving the salvor’s recovery position.

The lien is property-specific. The salvor has a lien over the vessel and over the cargo and bunker, but not over freight earnings or owner-side assets ashore. The lien is enforceable by arrest of the vessel in any forum that recognises maritime liens, with the Arrest Convention 1999 providing the modern uniform framework in States that have ratified.

Relationship to General Average and York-Antwerp Rules 2016

General Average is the ancient maritime rule under which sacrifices and expenditures voluntarily made for the common safety of the maritime adventure are shared among all interests in proportion to their saved value. The modern codification is the York-Antwerp Rules, most recently the York-Antwerp Rules 2016 adopted by the Comité Maritime International. General Average is contractually incorporated into virtually all bills of lading, voyage charterparties, and time charterparties.

The relationship to salvage is layered. A salvage award under Article 13 is itself a General Average expenditure if the contracting parties made the agreement on behalf of all interests, in which case the award is apportioned among hull, cargo, and freight at risk in proportion to their respective values. SCOPIC remuneration is treated differently. Under York-Antwerp Rules 2016 Rule VI, SCOPIC remuneration is excluded from General Average and falls solely on the shipowner. The exclusion was a deliberate CMI decision in the negotiation of the 2004 and 2016 Rules, on the basis that SCOPIC is environmental compensation for an owner-side liability rather than a common-safety expenditure benefiting cargo.

The York-Antwerp Rules 2016 are the dominant version, with the 2004 Rules remaining in use under some older charter forms. The 1994 Rules, which preceded the 2004 revision, are largely superseded.

Per-state ratification status as at 2026

The 1989 Salvage Convention as at 2026 binds approximately 75 States representing more than ninety percent of world merchant tonnage. The ratifying States include all major flag States, port States, and salvor-host States.

Major flag States bound include the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Greece, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Panama, Singapore, Malta, Cyprus, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Russia.

Major port States bound include all of the European Union maritime States, India, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Australia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.

Notable abstentions or partial accessions include several smaller flag States that operate under customary salvage law and the 1910 Brussels Convention. The IMO Secretariat, as depositary, publishes the up-to-date ratification table. The UN Treaty Collection (MTDSG No. XII-12) provides a parallel consolidated ratification record.

The Convention’s territorial application follows the standard IMO architecture: it applies to salvage operations in waters under the jurisdiction of a State Party, on the high seas, and to salvors and owners domiciled in or nationals of a State Party, with the precise scope determined by the forum State.

2024 to 2026 IMO proposals for Convention revision

The IMO Legal Committee in its sessions through 2024 and 2025 received submissions from the ISU, the International Group of P&I Clubs, and several State delegations proposing a comprehensive review of the 1989 Salvage Convention. Three structural pressures are identified in those submissions.

The first is declining commercial viability of professional salvor capacity. ISU revenue declined from approximately USD 750 million in 2014 to approximately USD 300 to 400 million in the early 2020s. The submissions argue that the Article 14/SCOPIC architecture, while functional, has not kept pace with the cost of maintaining global salvor capability and that a structural revision is required to sustain adequate capacity.

The second is the transition to alternative-fuel and electrified shipping. Salvage of a vessel powered by ammonia, methanol, hydrogen, or large lithium-ion battery banks involves hazards and response techniques not contemplated in 1989. The Article 14 environmental-damage definition refers to pollution and contamination but is not calibrated for thermal-runaway battery fires or ammonia plume dispersal scenarios.

The third is the interface with Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). The 1989 Convention assumes a manned vessel with a master who can sign LOF. Drafting salvage rules for unmanned or remotely operated vessels is a pending IMO work-stream tied to the broader MASS Code under MSC.

The Legal Committee through 2025 received but has not adopted a formal “Salvage Convention 2026” revision proposal. The current expectation in industry submissions is that the 2024 to 2025 work will produce, by the end of 2026 or 2027, an IMO Diplomatic Conference considering a wholesale revision, with the SCOPIC architecture likely to be elevated from a contractual supplement to a treaty-level provision.

A fourth strand in the 2024 to 2025 submissions concerns place of refuge. The 1989 Convention contains no direct provision on the salvor’s right to bring a casualty to a coastal State’s port or anchorage. IMO Resolution A.949(23), adopted in 2003, provides Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance, but these are non-binding. Several major incidents since 2003, including the Prestige in 2002 off Spain (which predated A.949(23)) and the Rena off New Zealand in 2011, have demonstrated that coastal States can refuse or delay entry to a casualty in ways that prolong environmental exposure and increase salvage cost. The ISU and International Group submissions to the Legal Committee in 2024 propose a treaty-level right for a salvor in control of a casualty to demand temporary access to a place of refuge, subject to coastal State environmental and safety assessment. This proposal would require amendment to the 1989 Convention or a new supplementary protocol and is contested by coastal State delegations who resist treaty constraints on sovereign port-entry decisions.

Duty of co-operation and Article 9: coastal State rights

Article 9 of the 1989 Salvage Convention preserves the right of a coastal State to take measures to protect its coastline or related interests from pollution or the threat of pollution. Where such measures are taken, they may not be challenged under the Convention by the salvor as interference with the salvage contract; the State’s public-law authority is recognised as an external constraint on the private LOF regime. The coastal State may, under Article 9, direct salvage operations, prescribe methods, require the salvor to use specific equipment, require the casualty to be taken to a specific place, or impose conditions on the conduct of the operation.

The practical consequence is that the salvor under LOF operates within a dual authority structure: the LOF contract and the 1989 Convention govern the salvor’s relationship with the owner; Article 9 and the coastal State’s domestic legislation govern the salvor’s relationship with the State. Where the two authorities conflict, for example where the LOF arbitrator would assess the salvor’s methods as reasonable but the coastal State requires a different method that increases cost, the additional cost is in principle capturable in the Article 14 expenses or the SCOPIC tariff as a loss resulting from compliance with State direction. This interface between the private remunerative regime and the public regulatory authority is one of the most active areas of SCOPIC arbitration practice.

Limitations

The 1989 Salvage Convention and the SCOPIC clause produce a legally rich but commercially incomplete framework for several documented reasons.

The Article 14 “fair rate” problem was not fully resolved by SCOPIC. SCOPIC addressed it contractually for LOF cases, but casualties handled outside LOF, for example under bespoke contracts between shipowners and state-owned tug companies, still apply Article 14 directly and face the Nagasaki Spirit interpretation. The result is uneven incentives depending on the contract form chosen.

SCOPIC tariff rates are published by the ISU, an industry body. The tariff is not set by any government authority or IMO body and reflects the commercial interests of the salvor community. Property and P&I underwriters have contested specific tariff rates, and SCOPIC disputes over the proper day rate for specific equipment classes remain common in arbitration.

The no-cure-no-pay principle creates a structural gap in the lowest-value, highest-risk casualties. A salvor faced with a container ship carrying no significant cargo value, carrying a cargo of hazardous chemicals threatening coastal waters, can in principle claim Article 14 or SCOPIC remuneration, but the quantum is limited by expenses and tariff respectively. If no commercial salvor can be contracted on acceptable terms in time, the State bears the response cost without a private-law recourse mechanism.

The 75-State ratification figure, while representing over 90 percent of world merchant tonnage, leaves non-ratifying States governed by the 1910 Brussels Convention or customary law. In casualties occurring in the exclusive economic zone of a non-ratifying State, the applicable law on Article 14 special compensation depends on the forum State’s conflict-of-laws analysis, producing uncertainty.

Salvage of vessels with alternative propulsion fuels is outside the 1989 framework. Article 1(d)’s definition of environmental damage by reference to “pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents” is broad enough to reach ammonia or hydrogen releases by ejusdem generis reasoning, but the application to solid-state battery fire events that do not involve “pollution” in the traditional oil sense has not been judicially tested.

The transition from salvage to wreck removal is a commercial and legal discontinuity, not a smooth regulatory handoff. The Salvage Convention governs the salvage phase; WRC 2007 governs the wreck-removal phase; the transition point is determined by the parties’ contract, not by a treaty rule. In multi-party casualties where the salvor, the owner’s club, the cargo interests, and the coastal State each have a distinct view of when the transition occurred, disputes over which regime governs specific expenditures are routine.

Frequently asked questions

What does no-cure-no-pay mean under the 1989 Salvage Convention?

Article 12 states that salvage operations which have had a useful result give right to a reward; no payment is due if the operations have had no useful result. The reward under Article 13 is therefore conditional on a measurable saving of vessel, cargo, or other property.

What is the difference between Article 13 and Article 14 of the Salvage Convention 1989?

Article 13 is the no-cure-no-pay property award, capped at the salved value of vessel and cargo. Article 14 is the environmental safety-net: if the salvor has worked on a vessel threatening damage to the environment and earned less under Article 13 than its expenses, Article 14 tops up to expenses plus up to 30 percent (or up to 100 percent in exceptional cases) uplift. Article 14 pays even if the salvor saves nothing of property value.

What is the SCOPIC clause and how does it differ from Article 14?

SCOPIC (Special Compensation P&I Club clause) is a contractual addendum to Lloyd's Open Form, first introduced in 1999. By salvor election it replaces Article 14 with a tariff-based daily-rate mechanism plus a flat 25 percent uplift. Article 14 uses the tribunal's discretion and a fair-rate expenses base; SCOPIC uses the published ISU tariff and a fixed uplift. The salvor must elect one or the other; they are not cumulative.

When did the Salvage Convention 1989 enter into force?

The Convention entered into force on 14 July 1996, one year after the fifteenth instrument of ratification was deposited with the IMO Secretary-General as depositary.

Is SCOPIC part of the Salvage Convention 1989?

No. SCOPIC is a private contractual clause, drafted by the International Salvage Union and the International Group of P&I Clubs, integrated into Lloyd's Open Form 2000 and subsequent editions as an opt-in supplement. It is not a treaty, not an IMO instrument, and has no force independent of the LOF agreement in which it is incorporated.

What is the maximum uplift under Article 14?

Article 14.2 fixes the standard uplift at 30 percent of the salvor's expenses where damage has been prevented or minimised. The tribunal may, if it considers it fair and just, increase the total uplift to a maximum of 100 percent of the salvor's expenses. The 100 percent ceiling is the absolute contractual maximum.

Does the salvor's Article 13 award count toward the Article 14 top-up?

Yes. Article 14.4 provides that total compensation under Article 14 is paid only to the extent it exceeds the Article 13 reward. Article 14 is a top-up mechanism, not an additional layer; the salvor collects whichever is larger.