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Ship Finance and Asset Valuation

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A ship is two things at once: a tool that earns money by moving cargo, and a capital asset that can be bought, mortgaged, depreciated, and sold for a gain or a loss that often dwarfs a single year’s operating profit. A Capesize bulker fixed on a good iron-ore voyage might net a few thousand dollars a day over its running cost; the same hull bought near the bottom of the cycle and sold two years later near the top can change hands for tens of millions of dollars more than it cost. Treating the ship only as an operating unit misses where much of the money in shipping is actually made and lost. This article covers the ship as a financial asset: what sets its value, how it is bought and sold, how it is financed, how it is depreciated on the books, and how it ends its life as steel. The companion asset depreciation calculator and the vessel scrap price calculator handle the two ends of that life numerically.

The cluster this article anchors connects the freight market to the capital market. The Baltic Dry Index and freight indices tell you what a ship earns; this article explains how those earnings capitalize into a hull value, and the ship sale and purchase article works through the contract mechanics of the transfer in detail. Read together they describe the full loop: freight to earnings, earnings to asset value, asset value to a financed transaction, and eventually to a demolition sale.

The four prices that bracket a ship’s life

Every ship lives between four prices, and they move together over the cycle. The newbuilding price is what a yard charges to build the hull from a clean contract. The secondhand price is what delivered, trading tonnage changes hands for in the sale and purchase market. The earnings, expressed as the time charter equivalent in dollars per day, are what the ship makes carrying cargo. The demolition price is what a recycling yard pays for the empty steel at the end. The first three rise and fall with the freight market; the fourth is a steel-scrap price that sets a rough floor under the others.

The connective logic is capitalization. A ship’s market value is the present value of the net cash it is expected to earn over its remaining life, plus its residual scrap value, discounted back to today. When the freight market lifts the daily time charter equivalent, the expected cash stream rises, and the secondhand price rises with it because a buyer is paying for that cash. This is why secondhand values and one-year timecharter rates track each other closely: the timecharter rate is the market’s cleanest read on near-term earnings, and the asset price is that read extended over the ship’s remaining years. An owner who wants to test how a change in daily earnings flows through to the value of the hull is doing a discounted-cash-flow exercise, the same one a buyer’s analyst runs before bidding.

The four prices do not move in lockstep, and the gaps between them carry information. When the secondhand price for a five-year-old ship rises above the newbuilding price for the same type, the market is saying that earnings now beat the cost of waiting two to three years for a new hull, and owners order newbuildings. When the secondhand price collapses toward the demolition value, the market is saying the ship is worth little more than its steel, and scrapping accelerates. The spread between the newbuilding price and the secondhand price, and the spread between the secondhand price and the scrap price, are the two signals that drive the supply side of the whole industry.

How earnings capitalize into hull value

The mechanism is a discount calculation, not a rule of thumb. Take a ship’s expected net daily earnings, the time charter equivalent less the daily operating cost, project them across the remaining economic life, add the residual demolition value at the end, and discount the whole stream at a rate that reflects the cost of capital and the risk of the cash flows. The result is the asset’s fundamental value. A buyer who pays that figure is paying exactly for what the ship will earn. In practice the market does not compute one clean number; brokers value by comparable sales, recent fixtures of similar tonnage, but the comparables themselves are anchored by the same earnings logic.

Two features of this make ship values more volatile than the earnings underneath them. First, the cash stream runs over a long life, so a change in the expected long-run earning level moves the present value by a large multiple of the annual change. Second, the discount rate itself moves with sentiment and credit conditions: cheap, available ship finance lifts asset prices by lowering the rate applied to the same cash, and a credit squeeze does the reverse. So an asset price can swing harder than the freight market that drives it, because both the numerator (expected earnings) and the denominator (the discount rate) move at once and often in the same direction. That double sensitivity is the engine of the asset play.

The asset play

The asset play is the deliberate purchase of a ship near the bottom of the price cycle to sell it near the top, capturing the capital gain on the hull. It is a distinct strategy from earning a return by trading the ship, and in a strong upswing it can dominate the operating return. The play works because ship values are cyclical and mean-reverting. High freight rates pull in newbuilding orders; the orderbook delivers two to three years later into a market that the new supply oversupplies; rates and values fall; scrapping rises and ordering stops; supply tightens; and values recover. An owner who buys when the orderbook is thin and prices are near scrap, then sells when the orderbook is bloated and prices are near newbuilding parity, is trading that cycle rather than the freight.

The risk in the asset play is timing and leverage. A ship bought near the bottom with an 80% mortgage is a leveraged bet on the cycle turning before the loan covenants bite. If values fall further, the loan-to-value breaches, the bank can call for more equity or sell the ship into a depressed market, and the owner loses the deposit-sized equity many times over. The same leverage that magnifies the gain on a correct timing call magnifies the loss on a wrong one. This is why the asset play is the preserve of well-capitalized owners and shipping funds with the balance sheet to hold through a longer-than-expected trough, not a strategy for a thinly financed single-ship company.

The sale and purchase process

A secondhand ship sale runs through a defined sequence, and the discipline of that sequence is what protects both sides in a transaction that often moves tens of millions of dollars against a hull the buyer has inspected for a day. The process begins with the brokers. A buyer’s broker and a seller’s broker, often different firms, negotiate the main terms: the price, the delivery range and window, the inspection rights, and the form of contract. Most worldwide secondhand sales use one of two standard forms, and the negotiation is conducted as amendments to that form rather than from a blank sheet.

The dominant form is the Norwegian Saleform. SALEFORM 2012, whose copyright is held by the Norwegian Shipbrokers’ Association and which is adopted and published by BIMCO, has been the workhorse Memorandum of Agreement for the international secondhand market. It replaced SALEFORM 1993 after an eleven-month review, and the Documentary Committee approved it in November 2011. In February 2026 the Norwegian Shipbrokers’ Association and BIMCO adopted SALEFORM 2025, which modernizes the payment and escrow mechanics around know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering practice and adds sanctions, anti-corruption, and environmental clauses, while keeping the structural backbone of the earlier editions. BIMCO also publishes SHIPSALE 22, a separate standard sale agreement with electronic-signature and e-document workflows. The detailed clause-by-clause treatment lives in the ship sale and purchase article; what follows is the financial spine of the deal.

The Memorandum of Agreement and the deposit

The Memorandum of Agreement, the MOA, is the sale contract. Signing it commits both parties and triggers the deposit. Under SALEFORM 2012 the deposit is 10% of the purchase price, paid into a joint account or, increasingly, an escrow account within a few banking days of signing. The 10% deposit is the buyer’s earnest money and the seller’s security: if the buyer defaults, the seller is entitled to the deposit and can claim further proven losses; if the seller fails to deliver the ship in the agreed condition, the deposit is refunded with the interest it earned. The deposit sizing is not arbitrary. It is large enough to make a walk-away costly for the buyer and to compensate a seller for taking the ship off the market, and small enough that the buyer is not exposed to the full price before the ship is delivered and inspected.

The balance, the other 90%, is paid on delivery against the closing documents. Between signing and delivery the buyer arranges its finance, the seller readies the documents and brings the ship to the delivery position, and the buyer exercises its inspection rights. The gap between deposit and balance is where the buyer’s mortgage lender enters: the lender’s funds typically arrive at closing to make up the balance, secured by a mortgage registered against the ship the moment title passes. The choreography of deposit, finance, and balance is why a sale and purchase closing is a tightly timed event, often with funds, documents, and the physical delivery all coordinated to the same hour.

Inspection, classification records, and condition

A buyer of secondhand tonnage is buying a used industrial asset, and the inspection rights in the MOA are how the buyer protects against the condition risk. The standard sale gives the buyer a physical inspection of the ship and an inspection of the classification records. The class records, held by the ship’s classification society, document every survey, every condition of class, and every outstanding recommendation: a recommendation is a noted defect the society requires the owner to rectify within a set period. A buyer’s superintendent reads these records to understand the ship’s maintenance history and any deferred work, because a ship can pass a walkthrough yet carry a stack of recommendations that will cost the new owner heavily at the next drydock.

Condition at delivery is the other half. The standard form requires the ship to be delivered with class maintained and free of recommendations affecting class, so the seller must clear outstanding class items before tendering a valid notice of readiness. Many sales also provide for an underwater inspection by divers or a drydocking if the divers find damage, with the cost allocation set in the MOA. The buyer who finds a problem at this stage is in a far stronger position than one who discovers it after taking delivery, which is why the inspection clauses are negotiated carefully and why a buyer planning a heavy post-purchase refit will price the expected drydock and repair cost into the bid rather than the headline price alone.

Delivery, the bill of sale, and encumbrance-free title

Delivery transfers the ship. At closing the seller hands over the bill of sale, the document that actually conveys title, executed and usually notarized and legalized or apostilled so it can be registered in the buyer’s chosen flag. Alongside it come the protocol of delivery and acceptance recording the exact time and place of transfer, the classification and statutory certificates, the deletion certificate from the old registry or a power of attorney to procure it, and the other documents the MOA lists. The buyer simultaneously releases the balance of the price, and the deposit is applied to the purchase.

The single most important financial protection in the delivery is the requirement that the ship be delivered free of encumbrances. The seller warrants the ship is free of all mortgages, maritime liens, and other debts and claims, so the buyer takes clean title. This matters because a maritime lien can attach to the ship itself regardless of who owns it: an unpaid crew wage, a salvage claim, or a bunker bill from the previous owner can follow the hull and be enforced against the new owner by arresting the ship. The encumbrance-free warranty, backed by the seller’s indemnity and the registry’s deletion of the old mortgage, is what lets a buyer pay tens of millions of dollars and a lender register a fresh first-priority mortgage without inheriting the seller’s debts. Title passes clean, the old mortgage is discharged, and the new mortgage is registered, all at closing.

Newbuildings: ordering a ship from a yard

Building a ship is a different transaction from buying one. The buyer is not acquiring an existing asset but commissioning one, paying a yard in stages over a two-to-three-year construction period against a contract that allocates the risks of delay, defect, and yard insolvency. The contract is the shipbuilding contract, and it governs the specification, the price, the payment schedule, the inspection regime, the delivery and performance warranties, and the remedies if the ship is late or off-specification.

Two contract families dominate. The Japanese Shipbuilders’ Association form, the SAJ form, is long-established and widely used in Asian yards, and it is generally regarded as builder-leaning in its risk allocation. BIMCO’s NEWBUILDCON, issued in 2007, is the standard international newbuilding contract drafted for use in any jurisdiction and for any ship type, written to be more balanced between builder and buyer than the older yard forms. An owner ordering a ship chooses or negotiates from one of these, and the choice of form shapes how much delay and performance risk sits with the buyer. The contract negotiation for a newbuilding is heavier than for a secondhand sale because the buyer is committing to a price years before the asset exists and the market that will receive it is unknown.

The instalment schedule and the refund guarantee

A newbuilding is paid in instalments tied to construction milestones. A common structure spreads the price across several payments: one on signing the contract, then payments at steel cutting, at keel laying, at launching, and the final and often largest instalment on delivery. The schedule funds the yard’s working capital as it builds, and it exposes the buyer to a real risk: each instalment paid before delivery is money handed to the yard against a ship that does not yet exist and cannot yet be arrested or sold if the yard fails.

The refund guarantee is the buyer’s protection against that risk, and BIMCO calls it the financial cornerstone of a shipbuilding project. It is a bank guarantee, issued by the yard’s bank in the buyer’s favor, that refunds the buyer’s paid instalments with interest if the yard defaults, becomes insolvent, or fails to deliver. The guarantee is not part of the shipbuilding contract itself, but the contract is unlikely to be signed without one, because the buyer is otherwise an unsecured creditor of a shipyard for the value of every pre-delivery instalment. The buyer’s pre-delivery exposure is therefore only as good as the refund guarantee and the bank that stands behind it, which is why the identity and standing of the guaranteeing bank is negotiated as carefully as the price. The total capital commitment, the instalment timing, and the financing cost across the build period are the inputs to a newbuilding capex model, which an owner runs to compare a newbuilding against buying delivered secondhand tonnage.

Depreciation, book value, and economic life

On the owner’s balance sheet the ship is a depreciating asset. The accounting question is how to spread the purchase cost across the years the ship will earn, and the standard answer in shipping is straight-line depreciation over the ship’s economic life down to its residual scrap value. A ship’s economic life for accounting is commonly taken as 20 to 25 years, the period over which a well-maintained hull remains commercially competitive before age, rising maintenance, and tightening regulation push it toward demolition. Straight-line depreciation writes off the cost less the estimated scrap residual in equal annual amounts across that life.

The residual the depreciation runs down to is the demolition value, not zero, because a ship at the end of its economic life is still worth its steel. So the depreciable base is the purchase price minus the estimated scrap value, and the annual depreciation is that base divided by the economic life in years. The asset depreciation calculator computes this and the resulting book value at any age, given the cost, the residual scrap estimate, and the life assumption.

Book value versus market value

The crucial point for a financial reader is that book value and market value are different numbers, and the gap between them is where shipping balance sheets get interesting. Book value is an accounting construct: the original cost depreciated on a fixed schedule, indifferent to the freight market. Market value is what the ship would actually fetch in a sale today, set by the cycle. A ship bought at a cyclical peak and depreciated straight-line can sit on the books well above what it would now sell for in a trough; the same ship bought at a trough can be worth far more in the market than its depreciated book value after a recovery.

This divergence has hard consequences. A market value below book value can force an impairment write-down under accounting standards, hitting reported equity and potentially tripping loan covenants tied to net worth. A market value above book value is an unrealized gain the asset play is built to capture, invisible on the balance sheet until the ship is sold. Banks lend against market value, not book value, which is why a loan-to-value covenant is tested against a current broker valuation, and why a fall in market values can breach the covenant even though the book value, and the loan balance, are unchanged. The two numbers answer different questions: book value is about allocating historical cost; market value is about what the asset is worth now.

Demolition: the ship as steel

Every ship ends as scrap, and the demolition value is the floor under the whole valuation. When a ship’s expected earnings net of operating and upcoming drydock costs fall below what a recycling yard will pay for its steel, the rational decision is to sell it for demolition rather than keep trading it. The demolition sale is a real transaction with its own brokers, its own price benchmark, and now its own regulatory regime.

LDT and the dollar-per-LDT price

Demolition value is computed on light displacement tonnage, LDT, not deadweight. LDT is the weight of the ship herself, the empty hull, machinery, and equipment with no cargo, fuel, stores, or crew aboard, expressed in tonnes. It is a fixed physical property of the ship and a close proxy for the weight of recoverable steel, which is what a recycling yard actually buys. The demolition value is the LDT multiplied by the prevailing price in US dollars per LDT that yards in the main breaking markets are offering. The vessel scrap price calculator does exactly this multiplication and lets an owner test the demolition proceeds against the cost of one more trading cycle.

The split between the two factors is what makes scrap valuation behave the way it does. LDT is fixed for a given ship, so all the volatility in the demolition value comes from the dollar-per-LDT rate, and that rate is a steel-scrap price set by recycling-yard demand and the scrap-steel market. It rises when steel demand and recycling competition are strong and falls when they are weak, and it differs between recycling markets. The largest demolition markets are on the Indian subcontinent, the beaching yards of Alang in India, Chattogram in Bangladesh, and Gadani in Pakistan, alongside Turkish yards at Aliaga, and the dollar-per-LDT offered varies between them with local steel prices and currency. An owner timing a demolition sale watches that rate the way a trading owner watches the freight index.

The Hong Kong Convention and recycling compliance

A demolition sale is no longer purely a steel transaction; it now carries a compliance layer. The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, adopted in 2009, entered into force on 26 June 2025, twenty-four months after Bangladesh and Liberia deposited the instruments that satisfied its entry-into-force conditions in June 2023. The Convention sets binding requirements on both ships and recycling facilities: a ship must carry an Inventory of Hazardous Materials documenting the asbestos, PCBs, heavy metals, and other hazards in its structure, and a recycling facility must be authorized and operate to a Ship Recycling Facility Plan. The full regulatory treatment, including the European Union’s parallel Ship Recycling Regulation and the Basel Convention, is in the Hong Kong Convention article.

For the financial reader the point is that the compliance regime affects which yards a ship can lawfully be sold to and what documentation the demolition sale must carry, and therefore the net price. A ship sold for recycling under the standard demolition contracts now moves into a market where the buying yard’s authorization status and the ship’s IHM are part of the deal, not an afterthought. The dollar-per-LDT headline a yard offers is the gross; the net to the owner depends on meeting the documentary and facility-compliance requirements that the Convention and regional rules impose. The demolition floor under a ship’s value is still set by LDT times the scrap rate, but reaching that floor cleanly now runs through a compliance gate that did not exist before mid-2025.

Financing the ship

Few ships are bought for cash. The dominant financing tool is the ship mortgage, a security interest registered against the ship in its flag registry that gives the lender the right to arrest and sell the ship if the loan defaults. A first-priority mortgage registered against a clean title is strong security: it travels with the ship, ranks ahead of most later claims, and is enforceable in most jurisdictions through the ship-arrest remedy. This is why the encumbrance-free delivery discussed above matters so much to the lender as well as the buyer: the lender is funding the balance at closing precisely so that its fresh mortgage attaches to a hull free of the seller’s old debts.

Loan-to-value and the mortgage covenants

The size of the loan against the ship is governed by the loan-to-value ratio, the loan amount as a percentage of the ship’s market value. A lender advances a fraction of the value, requiring the owner to fund the rest as equity, so the lender has a cushion if values fall. The loan-to-value is tested through the life of the loan against current market valuations, usually from independent shipbrokers, and a value-maintenance covenant requires the owner to top up equity or post additional security if the ratio breaches its agreed ceiling. This is the covenant that bites in a downturn: a fall in market values lifts the loan-to-value even though the loan balance and the ship are unchanged, and a breach can force the owner to inject cash at the worst point in the cycle or face the lender selling the ship. The loan-to-value covenant is the financial transmission belt that turns a freight-market downturn into a balance-sheet crisis for a leveraged owner.

Sale and leaseback and lessor finance

Beyond the traditional mortgage, leasing has become a major channel of ship finance, much of it from Chinese leasing houses. In a sale and leaseback, an owner sells the ship to a lessor and immediately charters it back on a long bareboat or finance lease, often with an option or obligation to buy it back at the end. The owner gets the sale proceeds as financing and keeps operating the ship; the lessor holds title as its security, which is a stronger position than a mortgagee because the lessor owns the asset outright rather than holding a charge over someone else’s. Sale and leaseback can raise a higher proportion of the ship’s value than a conventional mortgage, which is why it grew as bank lending to shipping tightened, and it shifts the residual-value and refinancing risk in ways the parties negotiate in the lease.

The lessor’s economics are the mirror of the mortgage lender’s. Where the bank earns interest on a loan secured by a mortgage, the lessor earns lease payments on an asset it owns, and at the end of the lease the residual value, the buyback price or the open-market value, determines who captured the asset’s worth. For the owner, the choice between a mortgage and a sale and leaseback is a choice between keeping title and equity upside while carrying the loan-to-value covenant, or releasing more cash up front while ceding title and structuring a buyback. Both are ways of turning the ship’s capital value into spendable finance against its future earnings.

Brokers and commission

Brokers stand between the parties in every one of these transactions, and they are paid by commission. In a sale and purchase, the broker’s commission is a percentage of the sale price, customarily around 1% per broker, paid by the seller. In chartering, an address commission and a brokerage commission come off the freight or hire. In a newbuilding, a broker arranging the order earns a commission on the contract price. The commission is small as a percentage but large in absolute dollars on a multi-million-dollar transaction, and it is the broker’s incentive to find the counterparty, run the negotiation, and close the deal. The ship brokerage commission calculator computes the commission on a sale, charter, or newbuilding given the price and the agreed rate, and the port disbursement tooling handles the separate agency costs that arise when the ship actually calls a port.

Operating cost and the carrying cost of the asset

Owning a ship between purchase and sale is not free, and the carrying cost erodes the asset play if the timing is slow. A trading ship carries daily operating costs, crew, stores, lubricants, insurance, maintenance, and management, that accrue every day regardless of whether the ship is earning. On top of those sit the periodic costs of keeping the ship in class: the special survey and drydocking every five years, the intermediate survey between them, and the steel and machinery work they uncover. A ship approaching a special survey with heavy expected steel renewal can be worth less than its scrap value to a trading owner, because the survey cost exceeds the remaining earning potential, which is exactly the calculation that tips an old ship toward demolition.

When the freight market is too weak to cover even the daily operating cost, an owner may lay the ship up rather than trade it at a loss. Lay-up cuts the running cost to a fraction of the trading figure by reducing crew, fuel, and activity, but it does not cut it to zero, and reactivation carries its own cost. The vessel lay-up cost calculator estimates the cost of cold or hot lay-up against the cost of continuing to trade at a loss, which is the decision an owner faces at the bottom of the cycle. Lay-up is a way of carrying the asset through a trough cheaply enough to be alive for the recovery, the holding strategy that the asset play depends on.

Putting the asset together

The ship as a financial asset is the sum of these parts: a value set by capitalizing its earnings, bracketed below by its scrap steel and above by the cost of building new; bought and sold through a disciplined MOA process on a standard form with a 10% deposit and an encumbrance-free delivery; ordered new through a milestone instalment schedule protected by a refund guarantee; depreciated straight-line on the books toward its scrap residual while its market value swings with the cycle; financed by a mortgage or a sale and leaseback whose loan-to-value covenant transmits the freight cycle straight to the balance sheet; and ended as light displacement tonnage sold for steel under a compliance regime that, since 26 June 2025, runs through the Hong Kong Convention. Every one of these has a number attached, which is why the cluster pairs each with a calculator and why an owner who understands the asset, not just the trade, captures the part of shipping’s return that the freight market alone never shows.

Limitations

The valuations described here are mechanisms, not current numbers. This article deliberately states no specific newbuilding price, secondhand price, dollar-per-LDT scrap rate, mortgage interest rate, or loan-to-value ceiling, because all of those are market figures that move continuously and would be wrong the day after they were written. The dollar-per-LDT rate in particular differs between recycling markets and changes with the steel cycle; the only durable statement is the basis, LDT times the prevailing rate, not any rate itself. Anyone valuing a real ship must take the current figures from a broker valuation, a recycling-market report, and the live finance terms on offer.

The contract details are summarized at the financial level, not the legal one. SALEFORM 2012, SALEFORM 2025, SHIPSALE 22, NEWBUILDCON, and the SAJ form each run to many clauses with negotiated amendments, and the deposit percentage, inspection rights, condition warranties, and remedies in any actual deal are whatever the parties agreed in their MOA or contract, not a generic standard. The 10% deposit and the straight-line 20-to-25-year economic life are the customary market conventions, not legal requirements; a specific transaction or a specific company’s accounting policy may differ, and a transaction of any size should be run with a sale and purchase broker, a shipping lawyer, and the company’s auditors rather than from a reference summary.

The depreciation and capitalization framing is an accounting and valuation model, not a prediction. Straight-line depreciation is the common shipping convention but not the only permissible method, and impairment, componentized drydock accounting, and residual-value estimates vary by company and standard. The discounted-cash-flow logic that links earnings to value is sound in principle, but the inputs, the long-run earning level and the discount rate, are estimates that the market itself disagrees on, which is precisely why ship values are volatile and why the asset play carries real risk. Treat this as the structure of the problem, not a valuation of any ship.

See also

Frequently asked questions

What drives the value of a ship as an asset?
A ship's value is the discounted stream of its future net earnings, which is why the secondhand price tracks the freight market. When the time charter equivalent earned per day rises, the capital value of the hull rises with it, because a buyer is paying for the cash the ship will generate. The four prices that bracket a ship's life move together over the cycle: the newbuilding price at the yard, the secondhand price for delivered tonnage, the freight or charter earnings that capitalize into that secondhand price, and the demolition value as light displacement tonnage sold for steel.
What is the standard deposit in a ship sale and purchase?
Under the Norwegian Saleform, SALEFORM 2012, the deposit is 10% of the purchase price, paid into a joint or escrow account within a few banking days of signing the Memorandum of Agreement. The deposit is forfeited to the seller if the buyer defaults and refunded with accrued interest if the seller fails to deliver. SALEFORM 2025, adopted by the Norwegian Shipbrokers' Association and BIMCO in February 2026, keeps the deposit structure while modernizing the payment and escrow mechanics.
How is a ship's demolition or scrap value calculated?
Demolition value is the ship's light displacement tonnage (LDT), the weight of the empty steel structure, multiplied by the prevailing recycling price in US dollars per LDT offered by yards in the main breaking markets. LDT is a fixed physical property of the ship; the dollar-per-LDT rate is a volatile market price set by scrap-steel demand and recycling-yard competition, so the demolition value floor under a ship's market price moves with the steel cycle.
What is the asset play in shipping?
The asset play is buying a secondhand ship near the bottom of the freight cycle when prices are depressed and selling it near the top when prices have risen, capturing the capital gain on the hull rather than, or in addition to, the operating profit. It works because ship values are cyclical and mean-reverting: high freight rates pull in newbuilding orders that eventually oversupply the market and crash prices, then scrapping and order droughts tighten supply and lift them again.
What is the Hong Kong Convention and when did it enter into force?
The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, adopted in 2009, entered into force on 26 June 2025. It sets binding requirements for an Inventory of Hazardous Materials on board and for the authorization of recycling facilities, and it governs the Indian-subcontinent and Turkish yards that buy ships for demolition. For a shipowner, it raises the documentary and facility-compliance bar on a demolition sale.