NYPE 2015: New York Produce Exchange Time Charter

What NYPE 2015 is

NYPE 2015 is a time charter: the owner places a crewed, classed ship at the charterer’s commercial disposal for a period in exchange for hire paid by the day, while keeping the master and crew as the owner’s servants for navigation, safety and the technical running of the ship. The charterer directs the ship’s employment within agreed trading limits and a cargo-exclusion list, pays for the bunkers and the voyage costs, and carries the commercial risk of the market. That split, owner’s ship and crew, charterer’s voyage and cargo, is what separates the time charter from the voyage charter party, where the owner performs a named voyage for freight, and from the bareboat charter party, where the charterer takes the bare ship and mans it.

The form is used across the dry-bulk fleet, from Handysize to Capesize, and in the multipurpose, heavy-lift and container trades. It is not the tanker form, where Shelltime 4 governs, nor the gas or offshore forms. Periods run from a single laden leg, the time charter trip or TCT, through one-to-three-year period charters to long industrial fixtures.

Lineage: 1913 to 2015

The form began in 1913 at the New York Produce Exchange, the Manhattan commodity exchange that financed the grain, sugar and provisions trades through the port. The first edition codified the customary terms for taking tramp steamers on hire by the month to lift seasonal cargoes. The 1946 revision became the most heavily litigated charter document of the twentieth century, ran to forty-five clauses, and is the version behind most of the classic time-charter case law on safe ports, off-hire and performance. A 1981 ASBA revision gained limited traction. NYPE 1993, the breakthrough joint ASBA-BIMCO product, displaced the 1946 form globally and served the market for two decades. NYPE 2015 is the current edition, drawn up after twenty-two years of experience under NYPE 93 and a run of regulatory change: the ISPS Code, the MARPOL Annex VI sulphur regime, the Maritime Labour Convention, the rise of OFAC and EU sanctions enforcement, and cyber risk.

Structure and the Box layout

NYPE 2015 follows the BIMCO Box-layout architecture: a cover sheet of numbered Boxes captures the commercial particulars (vessel, owner, charterer, delivery and cancelling, hire rate and payment cycle, period, redelivery range, bunkers, trading limits, brokerage and notice addresses), and the Box entries feed the printed clauses by reference. The body runs to about fifty-seven numbered clauses and a signature page. The 2015 revision consolidated several NYPE 93 provisions: trading limits, berths and the right to sublet, scattered across separate NYPE 93 clauses, were pulled together early in the form, which is one reason the later clause numbers do not map one-to-one onto NYPE 93.

A practical warning follows from that renumbering, and it is the reason this article is careful with clause numbers. NYPE clause numbers are edition-specific, and a number that means one thing in NYPE 93 can mean something else in NYPE 2015 or in a rider. The numbers stated below are the ones that can be verified against the form and the standard commentaries; where a provision is described by name without a number, that is deliberate.

Hire, payment and withdrawal

Hire is a daily rate, quoted as “United States Dollars X per day or pro rata,” running from delivery to redelivery. The NYPE default payment cycle is semi-monthly, fifteen days in advance, by telegraphic transfer in cleared funds, with the first instalment on delivery and a pro-rata final instalment on redelivery. The gross hire for a period is simply the rate multiplied by the on-hire days:

The same arithmetic, with bunker delivery and redelivery accounting and address commission, drives the time charter daily-hire calculator. Late payment is the owner’s most powerful remedy and its most dangerous trap. NYPE 2015 carries an anti-technicality mechanism: before withdrawing the ship for non-payment the owner must serve notice and allow a short grace period, a discipline that grew out of the line of withdrawal cases. Wrongful withdrawal exposes the owner to a repudiation claim, so the grace-period machinery is followed to the letter.

Delivery, redelivery and the legitimate last voyage

The charter runs from delivery, in the condition and at the place the Box fixes, to redelivery within an agreed range, with the charterer giving tightening notices, often twenty, fifteen, ten, seven, five and three days, as redelivery nears. Two timing problems recur. The first is the cancelling date: if the ship is not delivered, ready and in the agreed condition, by the cancelling date, the charterer may cancel, and on a rising market that right is valuable enough to be fought over.

The second is the last voyage. A time charterer must not order a final voyage that cannot reasonably be expected to allow redelivery by the end of the charter period. The House of Lords settled the framework in The Gregos [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1: a voyage order is judged legitimate by the estimate reasonably made when it is given, and an order that is illegitimate when given may be refused, while a voyage that becomes overrun through later delay leaves the charterer paying hire to actual redelivery at the charter rate, and exposed to damages for the owner’s lost follow-on fixture if the overrun is unreasonable. Charters soften the edge with an overlap-and-underlap allowance and, sometimes, a clause paying market hire for any period the redelivery runs beyond the charter rate.

Off-hire: Clause 17, and why it is net loss of time

Off-hire is the most litigated provision in any time charter, and in NYPE 2015 it is Clause 17. It was Clause 15 in NYPE 1946 and Clause 17 in NYPE 1993, so the market shorthand “Clause 17 off-hire” fits both the 1993 and 2015 editions. The clause suspends the charterer’s duty to pay hire when a listed cause prevents the full working of the vessel: deficiency of officers, crew or stores, fire, breakdown of or damage to hull, machinery or equipment, grounding, detention by average accidents to ship or cargo, dry-docking, and any other cause preventing the full working of the vessel.

The single most important point about the NYPE clause, and the one most often stated wrongly, is that it is a net-loss-of-time clause, not a period off-hire clause. The operative words are that “the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby lost.” The word “thereby” ties the loss of hire to time actually lost to the service, not to the bare duration of the event. The contrast is with a period clause, of the kind found in the Shelltime forms, where the ship goes off hire for the whole span of the event whether or not the charterer lost any time. The Court of Appeal confirmed the net-loss construction in The Athena [2013] EWCA Civ 1723, holding that the question is the time lost in performing the service immediately required of the vessel. The burden sits on the charterer to bring the case within the clause: hire is presumed to run, and it is for the charterer to prove both that the full working was prevented and that time was lost (The Mareva AS [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 368).

NYPE 2015 made one substantive change to the off-hire regime worth noting: it widened the exceptions so that events for which sub-charterers are responsible do not put the vessel off hire as against the head charterer, which protects owners in a charter chain.

“Any other cause” and the word “whatsoever”

The sweep-up wording, “any other cause preventing the full working of the vessel,” is the battleground. Without the word “whatsoever,” it is read ejusdem generis: the other cause must be of the same kind as the listed events, all of which concern the physical condition or efficiency of the ship or its crew. So a purely external, bureaucratic detention falls outside it. In The Laconian Confidence [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139, an eighteen-day detention by the Bangladeshi authorities over residue sweepings did not put the ship off hire under the bare clause, Rix J holding that without “whatsoever” the words are read in a limited way. Add “whatsoever” and the clause reaches extraneous causes such as third-party arrest, as in The Mastro Giorgis [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 66.

Piracy is the modern illustration. In The Saldanha [2010] EWHC 1340 (Comm), a ship seized by Somali pirates for two months was not off hire under a bare NYPE clause, because piracy is a totally extraneous cause outside the ejusdem generis reading, following The Laconian Confidence. The opposite result followed in The Captain Stefanos [2012] EWHC 571 (Comm), where a bespoke rider expressly listing capture and seizure put the ship off hire during the same kind of capture. The lesson for drafting is plain: if the charterer wants piracy or detention to count as off-hire, it has to be written in expressly. Where the off-hire turns on an arrest, the further question is whose act caused it; in The Global Santosh [2016] UKSC 20 the Supreme Court read the “agents” carve-out narrowly, confining it to acts in the actual performance of cargo operations.

Speed and consumption: the Clause 12 performance warranty

NYPE 2015 lifted the speed-and-consumption warranty out of the vessel-description preamble, where NYPE 93 left it, and made it a standalone, continuing warranty at Clause 12. The warranty is that the ship can steam at about a stated speed on about a stated consumption of a stated fuel grade in defined good weather, conventionally up to Beaufort force 4 and Douglas sea state 3 with no adverse current, with separate laden and ballast figures and separate sea, port-working and idle consumptions. Making it continuing means the owner is exposed to a performance claim for underperformance at any point in the period, not only at delivery.

The remedy for breach is compensation for the time lost and the extra bunkers consumed, assessed by reconstructing the good-weather periods of each voyage against the warranted figures less the “about” margin. It is not off-hire: a slow ship is a Clause 12 performance claim, not a Clause 17 off-hire event, and conflating the two is a common error. The reconstruction method is treated in charter-party speed and consumption warranties and the downstream deductions in off-hire and performance claims.

A performance claim is built by reconstruction. The charterer’s weather-routing analyst takes the good-weather periods of each voyage, those within the warranted Beaufort and sea-state limits with no adverse current, compares the speed actually made against the warranted speed less the “about” margin, conventionally half a knot, and extrapolates the shortfall across the voyage as time lost; the extra bunkers burned are valued at the bunker price. The owner’s defences run to the choice of sampling periods, attribution of the loss to weather or to the charterer’s own routing rather than the ship, the “about” margin, and the principle that the warranty bites only in the defined good weather and not on a simple average of voyage speed.

Bunkers and bunker quality

Bunkers are the charterer’s, in cost and in supply. The charterer takes over the fuel on board at delivery at an agreed price, pays for all bunkers stemmed during the period, and the owner takes back the fuel remaining at redelivery at the agreed redelivery price, with delivery and redelivery quantities set in the Box, usually within a tolerance. Quality is the friction point. The fuel must meet the agreed ISO 8217 grade and comply with the MARPOL Annex VI sulphur limits, 0.50 percent globally and 0.10 percent inside an emission control area, and samples are drawn under the MARPOL-compliant procedure and sealed for the master. Where bunkers prove off-specification, the form allocates the master’s right to refuse, the charterer’s duty to supply replacement fuel, and the cost of testing, removal and any engine or fuel-system damage, which makes the bunker provisions a frequent source of dispute in their own right.

Master, crew and the employment indemnity

The master and crew stay the owner’s servants, and the master keeps command over navigation, safety and the technical running of the ship, but must follow the charterer’s lawful orders on the ship’s employment: speed, routing, ports and cargo within the agreed limits. The hinge between those two roles is the employment indemnity. Because the master acts on the charterer’s commercial orders, the charterer indemnifies the owner against the consequences of the master following them, classically the consequences of the master signing bills of lading as presented, or following routing or cargo orders. The indemnity is not unlimited; it covers the consequences that flow from compliance with the order, not losses the owner would have borne anyway, and the case law on its reach is extensive. The master’s residual authority to refuse an order that threatens the safety of ship, crew or cargo is the counterweight, and it sits behind the safe-port and cargo-exclusion provisions.

Trading limits, safe ports and cargo exclusions

The charterer may trade the ship only within the agreed geographic limits, often expressed by reference to the Institute Warranty Limits with named additions or exclusions, and only between safe ports. The safe-port warranty is one of the most developed areas of charter law: a port is safe, in the classic formulation from The Eastern City [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127, if the ship can reach, use and leave it without being exposed, absent some abnormal occurrence, to danger that good navigation and seamanship cannot avoid. The owner’s remedy for an unsafe-port order, and the question of when the warranty is a continuing one, were worked through in The Evia (No. 2) [1983] 1 AC 736. The form also carries a cargo-exclusion list: cargoes the charterer cannot load without the owner’s prior agreement, typically explosives and radioactives, cargoes prohibited by the ship’s flag, class or insurers, and the IMSBC Group A cargoes prone to liquefaction unless specifically permitted. An order outside the limits or the exclusion list is one the master may decline.

Stevedore damage

Stevedores load and discharge under the charterer’s employment, and the form treats them as the charterer’s contractors, so the charterer answers for damage they cause to the ship: hatch covers, coamings, tank tops, frames, cargo gear, ladders and winches. The mechanism that makes the allocation work is the notice. The master must report stevedore damage promptly and in writing, with a description and, in practice, photographs, and obtain the stevedore’s acknowledgement where possible, before the ship sails. Damage that is not noticed in time is the recurring way an owner loses an otherwise good claim, because the later the report, the easier it is for the charterer to dispute that the stevedores caused it. Settlement is by repair at a yard rate or, failing agreement, through arbitration.

Cargo claims and the Inter-Club Agreement

When cargo is lost, damaged or short-delivered, the bill-of-lading holder sues the carrier, and the question between owner and charterer is who ultimately bears that liability. NYPE forms answer it through the Inter-Club New York Produce Exchange Agreement (ICA), incorporated through the cargo-claims clause (Clause 27 in both NYPE 93 and NYPE 2015). The ICA apportions cargo claims; it has nothing to do with off-hire, and the occasional phrase “Inter-Club Agreement off-hire” conflates two separate regimes. The ICA divides a paid cargo claim by fixed categories: claims from unseaworthiness or from error in the navigation or management of the ship fall 100 percent on owners; claims from the loading, stowage, lashing, discharge or handling of cargo fall 100 percent on charterers, reduced to a 50/50 split where the charter transfers cargo-handling responsibility to the owner by adding “and responsibility” to the employment clause; shortage and over-carriage split 50/50; and all other cargo claims split 50/50, in each case unless clear evidence shows one party’s act or neglect caused the loss.

The ICA is itself a living instrument. The current text is the 1996 Agreement as amended in September 2011, further amended with effect from 14 July 2025. The 2025 amendment did not touch the apportionment percentages; it clarified that a claim is “settled” for recovery purposes when resolved by judgment or award, not only by negotiated settlement, and confirmed recovery of defence costs. A charter that wants the current version should say so by name or incorporate “the Inter-Club Agreement 1996 as amended, or any subsequent amendment.”

Liens, letters of indemnity and bills of lading

NYPE 2015 strengthened the owner’s security for unpaid hire. The owner’s lien reaches not only the cargo but the sub-hires and sub-freights payable down a charter chain, which gives an owner facing default a route to intercept money owed to its defaulting charterer by a sub-charterer. The lien is a self-help remedy hedged with practical limits, and exercising it against third-party cargo or freight is itself a fertile source of dispute.

Letters of indemnity are the everyday lubricant of the dry trades. Original bills of lading often are not at the discharge port when the ship arrives, so the charterer asks the owner and master to deliver the cargo without production of the originals, against a letter of indemnity, and the standard wordings, drawn from the International Group of P&I Clubs, cover delivery without bills, delivery at a port other than that named in the bills, and the switching of bills. Where the exposure is large the letter is backed by a first-class bank guarantee, and the risk an owner runs is the letter expiring, or the bank declining, before the originals surface.

Where the time charterer issues bills of lading for the cargo, it issues them on its own form as carrier; those bills bind it as carrier to third-party holders under the Hague-Visby Rules brought in by the clause paramount, while the allocation of the resulting cargo liability back between charterer and owner runs through the Inter-Club Agreement, not through the bill. See bill of lading for the carriage-document detail.

General average, salvage and the protective clauses

General average under NYPE 2015 is adjusted on the York-Antwerp Rules 1994. This is a point the form settles plainly, the general-average clause stating that adjustment is in accordance with the 1994 Rules and includes the New Jason Clause; the figure of “York-Antwerp Rules 2016” sometimes attached to NYPE 2015 is wrong, because YAR 2016 was adopted by the Comite Maritime International in May 2016, after the 2015 form was published. The two are easy to confuse because BIMCO’s standalone General Average Clause was updated to YAR 2016, and a fixture that bolts that rider on, or that incorporates “York-Antwerp Rules 1994 or any subsequent modification,” can pull in the 2016 Rules; the English Commercial Court so held on the “subsequent modification” wording in the Star Antares decision in 2024. The unmodified NYPE 2015 form, though, names YAR 1994.

The form carries the standard protective clauses that allocate collision and casualty liabilities: the General Clause Paramount applying the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules to bills of lading, the Both-to-Blame Collision Clause, and the New Jason Clause that preserves the carrier’s right to a general-average contribution from cargo even where the casualty arose from a fault for which the carrier is exempt. Salvage and derelicts are for the joint benefit of owner and charterer after deduction of expenses and the crew’s share.

War risks, security and sanctions

War risks are governed by the BIMCO CONWARTIME 2013 clause, which lets the master refuse to expose the ship to a war-risk area, allocates additional war-risk premiums and crew bonuses to the charterer, and covers diversion, blockade and capture, with piracy expressly inside its definition of war risks. Security sits with the ISPS regime under SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the United States MTSA: the owner holds a valid International Ship Security Certificate and keeps to the ship security plan, the charterer keeps the ship to ISPS-compliant facilities, and the additional security costs follow whose requirement triggered them.

Sanctions are the live commercial risk of the post-2022 market, and here the line between the printed form and the riders matters. NYPE 2015, published in 2015, predates the modern BIMCO sanctions and cyber wordings. The BIMCO Sanctions Clause for Time Charter Parties 2020, the BIMCO Cyber Security Clause 2019 and the BIMCO Law and Arbitration Clause 2020 are later standalone clauses that parties bolt onto a NYPE 2015 fixture by rider; they are not, and cannot be, original numbered clauses of a 2015 form. The sanctions rider works by mutual warranty that neither party is a sanctioned party, a right for the owner to refuse a sanctioned voyage with the ship staying on hire, and a right for the innocent party to terminate.

Insurance and class

The insurance split tracks the ownership split. The owner carries hull and machinery cover, protection and indemnity entry with an International Group club, war-risk cover and crew cover, and provides certificates of entry on request; the charterer carries freight, demurrage and defence cover and any cargo interest of its own. Additional war-risk premiums for sending the ship into a listed area fall on the charterer, matching the CONWARTIME allocation. Running alongside is the owner’s continuing classification obligation: the ship must stay in class with the named society, an IACS member in the ordinary case, with all statutory and class certificates valid throughout the period. The charterer is given a right to inspect on reasonable notice and at its own expense, and to see survey reports, without disrupting the ship’s commercial employment. A lapse of class or of a statutory certificate is both a breach of the owner’s condition warranty and, where it stops the ship working, a potential off-hire event.

Law and arbitration: Clause 54

NYPE 2015 keeps its own law-and-arbitration provision at Clause 54. Its default, if the parties make no election in the Box, is United States law with arbitration in New York under the rules of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators. The clause also offers English law with London arbitration under the LMAA Terms, and Singapore arbitration under the SCMA rules. This is a genuine difference from the London-default assumption many practitioners carry over from other forms: on an unamended NYPE 2015 the seat is New York, not London, and a party wanting London and the LMAA has to elect it. In practice London and the LMAA are chosen in a large share of dry-cargo fixtures, given the depth of the English commercial-court supervisory jurisdiction, but that choice is made by election, not by default. Awards from any of the three seats enforce internationally under the New York Convention 1958.

NYPE 93 compared with NYPE 2015

The two editions share their spine, and a fixture clerk moving between them needs to know what changed:

The headline of the 2015 revision is that it is more owner-protective than NYPE 93: the continuing performance warranty cuts the other way, but the hire-default machinery, the lien over sub-hires, and the off-hire carve-outs for sub-charterer events all close gaps that owners had felt under the 1993 form.

Decarbonisation and the modern rider stack

A NYPE 2015 fixed today is wrapped in a stack of riders that the 2015 form never contemplated, because the regulatory load on a time charter has grown sharply since 2015. The recurring problem each one solves is the same: the owner is the party the regulator holds responsible, but the charterer controls the fuel and the voyage, so the cost has to be passed through by contract. The main BIMCO time-charter riders are:

• EEXI Transition Clause for Time Charter Parties 2021. It governs how an owner fits an engine or shaft power limiter to meet the MARPOL Annex VI EEXI requirement on a ship already on charter. The owner bears the modification cost and the time lost, and the new, lower maximum speed replaces the warranted maximum so the limiter cannot itself become a performance breach.
• CII Operations Clause for Time Charter Parties 2022. It shares operational carbon-intensity responsibility: the charterer operates the ship to hit an agreed annual CII while the owner keeps the ship efficient and stays the party answerable to the flag state. If the parties cannot agree a corrective plan, the owner may slow the ship to protect the rating, and the ship stays on hire while it does so.
• ETSA (Emission Trading Scheme Allowances) Clause for Time Charter Parties 2022. It puts the cost of EU Emissions Trading System allowances on the charterer, the fuel-payer, tracking the EU ETS for shipping phase-in of 40 percent of emissions in 2024, 70 percent in 2025 and 100 percent from 2026.
• FuelEU Maritime Clause for Time Charter Parties 2024. It allocates the cost of FuelEU Maritime compliance, in force from 1 January 2025, through a surcharge the charterer pays where the fuel mix leaves a compliance deficit, with banking, borrowing and pooling of the compliance balance handled between the parties.

Further out, the IMO Net-Zero Framework approved at MEPC 83 in April 2025, with its well-to-wake fuel-intensity standard and pricing mechanism, will need its own time-charter rider once it is adopted and in force; a charter fixed now for delivery into the late 2020s without a bespoke clause has no contractual home for that cost.

Time charter trip and period charter

A time charter trip is a single-leg time charter for the duration of one laden voyage. It looks like a voyage charter from the cargo’s point of view, the charterer pays for bunkers and port costs and controls the routing, but it is structured as a time charter, with daily hire, the off-hire mechanism and the performance warranty. Operators use the TCT to capture bunker savings from efficient routing or slow steaming without taking a longer commitment. A period charter, by contrast, runs for a fixed span of months or years and gives multi-voyage flexibility within the trading limits. The one-to-two-year band is the most actively fixed segment in dry bulk.

Statutory backdrop

NYPE 2015 is a private contract, not a regulation, but it operates against the IMO conventions it cross-refers to and the arbitration law of the chosen seat. The ship must hold and keep valid the certificates required under SOLAS, the ISM Code and the ISPS Code, comply with the MARPOL Convention including the Annex VI sulphur limits in the bunker and trading clauses, and meet the Ballast Water Management Convention. A lapse in a statutory certificate is both a potential off-hire event and a breach of the vessel-condition warranty. Cargo liability between carrier and cargo runs through the Hague-Visby Rules applied by the clause paramount, and the carrier-to-charterer split runs through the ICA.

Common drafting and citation errors

A handful of mistakes about NYPE 2015 recur often enough to be worth naming. The first is treating the off-hire clause as a period clause: NYPE off-hire is net loss of time, and the charterer must prove time actually lost, not merely point to the duration of a breakdown. The second is misquoting the off-hire clause number, which is Clause 17 in both NYPE 93 and NYPE 2015, not an earlier number carried over from a different form. The third is attaching the wrong York-Antwerp Rules to the form: the unamended NYPE 2015 names YAR 1994, not the YAR 2016 adopted after it was published. The fourth is assuming London and the LMAA by default, when the unamended Clause 54 defaults to US law and New York arbitration under SMA rules and London has to be elected. The fifth is reading the modern BIMCO sanctions, cyber and decarbonisation wordings as built-in clauses, when they are dated riders bolted onto the 2015 form, each with its own publication year and its own owner-charterer allocation. Reading the actual recap and the attached riders, rather than a generic description of “the NYPE form,” is what avoids all five.

Limitations

This article states the structure and the leading English-law construction of NYPE 2015; it is not legal advice, and any real fixture turns on the actual recap, the riders attached and the governing law elected. NYPE clause numbers are edition-specific: the numbers given here for off-hire (Clause 17), speed and consumption (Clause 12) and law and arbitration (Clause 54), and the use of York-Antwerp Rules 1994, are the verifiable features of the printed 2015 form, but a heavily amended fixture may renumber or override any of them, and the middle clauses of the form should be read from the form in hand rather than assumed. The BIMCO decarbonisation and sanctions clauses described here are riders with their own publication dates and their own revisions; their allocation of cost between owner and charterer is the default in the BIMCO text and is frequently varied by negotiation. Case law moves, and the off-hire authorities cited are the current frame rather than the last word.

See also

Calculators

• Time charter daily hire and market position
• Charter party standard-form picker
• Time charter equivalent (TCE) and voyage result

Related wiki articles

• Time charter party
• Voyage charter party
• Bareboat charter party
• Charter party speed and consumption warranties
• Off-hire and performance claims
• Laytime
• Demurrage
• Bill of lading
• EU ETS for shipping
• FuelEU Maritime

Leading cases and sources

• The Mareva AS [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 368: the burden of proving off-hire is on the charterer.
• The Aquacharm [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 (CA): off-hire turns on the vessel’s working efficiency, not operational inconvenience.
• The Berge Sund [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 453 (CA): off-hire is judged against the service immediately required of the vessel.
• The Laconian Confidence [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139: “any other cause” without “whatsoever” is read ejusdem generis.
• The Saldanha [2010] EWHC 1340 (Comm): piracy is not off-hire under a bare NYPE clause.
• The Captain Stefanos [2012] EWHC 571 (Comm): piracy is off-hire where an express rider covers capture and seizure.
• The Athena [2013] EWCA Civ 1723: NYPE off-hire is net loss of time, judged on the service immediately required.
• The Global Santosh [2016] UKSC 20: the “agents” carve-out in an off-hire arrest exception is read narrowly.
• BIMCO NYPE 2015; the Inter-Club New York Produce Exchange Agreement 1996 (as amended 2011 and 2025); the York-Antwerp Rules 1994; Coghlin and others, Time Charters, Informa Law; Cooke and others, Voyage Charters, Informa Law.